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0 Breaking the Climate Deadlock
A Global Deal for Our Low-Carbon Future
    Foreword
    by  Tony   Blair
There has been an enormous shift in opinion on climate change in recent years in favour of 
radical action. There is a coincidence between concern over the climate and anxiety over 
oil prices. Both point to a reduction in carbon dependence. Energy security has likewise 
leapt up the agenda.
For many reasons, now is the time to act. The challenge is to set a framework that allows 
change to happen at a pace that is (a) sufficient and (b) sensible. The good news is that 
there is a large degree of consensus as to the nature of the challenge and the need to 
deal with it.
Most people no longer need persuading that the changing climate poses a serious risk  
to humankind. Everyone, with oil at over $100 a barrel and with resources scarce, agrees 
that energy security is a crucial issue. There is now agreement that we should shift our 
economies away from carbon dependence. Again, most people agree that a framework 
for national and international action is needed to incentivise, encourage and oblige such 
a radical shift.
The question is: how? What is the framework that is sufficiently radical about where  
we have to go; and sufficiently realistic about where we are and the speed of travel?  
If we are not radical enough in altering the nature of our economic growth, we will not 
avoid potential catastrophe to the climate. If we are not realistic enough in setting a 
framework to get there, we will fail to achieve agreement.
Our citizens are alarmed at growing damage to the climate. Our citizens can also be 
alarmed at the radical scale of action necessary to prevent it. The task of political 
leadership is therefore to achieve the right national and international action that puts 
the global economy on a path to low-carbon growth, but does so in a way that does not 
hinder the completely legitimate aspirations of people – especially those in the poorer 
parts of the world – to enjoy the material and social benefits of growth and consumption. 
Given the complexity of the issues involved, the imprecision of much of the data, and the 
extraordinarily tricky interplay between the political, the technical and the organisational, 
answering the question of “how?” is as difficult as any the international community has 
grappled with since the design of the post-war Bretton Woods economic institutions.
The UNFCCC is charged with making the global deal and there is no route to such a global 
deal except under its authority. The purpose of this report is to lay out the issues, bring 
together the information currently available, and suggest a process for resolution. This 
is meant as an aid to the proper, formal UN process.
But we should be open about the substantial present political risk.
There is a danger of a yawning chasm between, on the one side, those in the scientific, 
NGO, and expert community who want very radical action immediately to cut greenhouse 
gas emissions; and on the other side, those in positions of political leadership who fear 
they are being asked for something beyond their power to deliver without damage to 
economic growth.
Just test it in this way. The core demand many make is for a 2020 interim target to be 
agreed in the UN negotiating process at Copenhagen at the end of 2009. The target 
demanded for developed countries is of the order of a 25-0 percent cut in emissions.  
It is a very bold commitment indeed. But, on closer analysis, it is even bolder than it 
appears. The target is set on a 1990 baseline – i.e., our progress in the next 11 years is to 
be measured against what happened almost 20 years ago. But many developed nations 
have seen emissions rise since 1990, not fall. In the US they have risen by over 16 percent; 
in Japan by over 7 percent. Some European countries – notably Germany and the UK – 
have seen falls. But just in the last 3 years, in Europe as a whole they have been roughly 
static. So a baseline of 1990 makes the target even tougher than it sounds.
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Essentially, we are asking North America, Europe and Japan to move from a situation of 
rising or static emissions in the last 12 years, to a significant, unprecedented cut in the 
next 12 to allow global emissions to peak by 2020.
Scientists will say: it is essential.
Political leaders will ask: is it possible?
We are not assisted by the fact that many of the figures used are open to intense debate 
as our knowledge increases. For example, we talk of a 25-0 percent cut by 2020. But,  
to state the obvious, 25 is a lot different from 0 percent. Some will say that to have a 
reasonable chance of constraining warming to approximately 2°C, we need greenhouse 
gas concentration to peak at 500 parts per million by volume (ppmv); some 50 ppmv; 
some even less. Some insist that 2020 is the latest peaking moment we can permit, 
beyond which damage to the climate will become irreversible; some, though generally 
not in the scientific community, say 2025 or even 2030 may be permissible.
Then there are important facts and deep political realities that we can easily miss.
•  Energy efficiency would provide around one quarter of the gains necessary and, 
incidentally, save money, but its significance is often ignored.
•  The vast majority of new power stations in China and India will be coal-fired; not 
“may be coal-fired”; will be. So developing carbon capture and storage technology 
is not optional, it is literally of the essence.
•  Without at least some countries engaging in a substantial renaissance of nuclear 
power, it is hard to see how any global deal could work.
•  Around 70-80 percent of the current stock of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere was 
created by the developed world.
•  But if the US meets the boldest targets for reductions while China continues on its 
present path, and India follows, the climate will still suffer irreversible damage.
•  For developing countries to grow sustainably they will need funds and technology, 
otherwise they will not be able to peak and then reduce emissions within the 
necessary timescale.
•  Deforestation amounts to around 15-20 percent of the entire emissions problem.
•  Certain key sectors like cement, steel and of course power most of all, account  
for a huge percentage – almost half of all emissions.
•  Airline and shipping emissions, though only 5 percent today, are a fast growing part 
of the problem.
•  Done right, the costs of abatement will be manageable and probably less than 
predicted; and there are potentially real opportunities for the new low-carbon 
economy that will develop.
There is another crucial political reality. The science is developing all the time. The  
one certain thing is that what is said today, in 2008, will not be quite the same as what  
is said by the time of Copenhagen, let alone in 2012 or 2015. Our knowledge is growing  
the whole time. Another pretty safe prediction: technology will develop in ways we  
cannot predict. But, for sure, if a clear set of incentives are given, the market will respond, 
human creativity and ingenuity will get to work, answers will be given tomorrow that  
cannot be contemplated today.
There is also an immense political danger which anyone who has participated in intricate 
and politically sensitive multilateral negotiations understands. If the Copenhagen meeting 
happens without a clear political direction already having been given, then it will be a 
negotiator’s nightmare. What is more, the danger is that countries then approach Copenhagen 
with minimalist positions, knowing concessions will be dragged out of them; rather than 
setting out genuinely the maximum that they think they can realistically achieve. The 
consequence will be an agreement of lowest common denominator, with a hotchpotch of 
complicated mechanisms that leaves the world little further forward and public opinion 
disillusioned and dissatisfied.
There is a different and better way of approaching a global deal. What is essential is that 
the world, especially the world of business, gets from Copenhagen a clear, unequivocal, 
radical direction. The exact speed of travel may vary and will be adjusted in time. But 
everyone needs to know that the direction is plain and unambiguous. Such a deal can be 
based around the following points:
A  The trend of opinion – scientific and political – is clear, for reasons of energy 
security as well as climate change: we have to change the way we grow, to reduce 
radically our dependence on carbon. That is why a 2050 global target of at least a  
50 percent reduction in emissions should now be able to be agreed.
B  The crucial thing at Copenhagen is to set a clear direction in order to achieve such  
a reduction, both for the developed and developing world. We must get the process 
of change under way; establish the pathway with interim targets for developed 
countries; but realise that between now and 2050 a lot will change about what  
we do and what we know.
C  The Hokkaido Toyako G8+5 and the Major Economies Meeting (MEM) should set  
out the agreement to the critical 2050 target and identify the core elements that  
go into the global deal.
D  There should then be a requisitioning of the necessary research and analysis so 
that the core elements have a real and substantial factual underpinning to support 
agreement on them.
E  The G8+5 and other major economies (for example, as with the MEM) in Italy in  
2009 should then get agreement on the core elements and how they fit together, 
and this should feed in to the Copenhagen process of the UN, which then can  
make the global deal.
F  The Copenhagen agreement should be the maximum that is politically realistic  
and achievable at this time, i.e., 2009.
G  A process should then be agreed to provide for periodic reviews of what has been 
done and what is necessary to do, so that the agreement can be adjusted. This 
should happen in a smaller forum of the key economies and feed into the UN 
process. So the idea would be for a rolling treaty, not a one-off resolution of an 
issue that cannot be concluded in 2009, or even shortly after.
H  Copenhagen can then do its work, knowing there is a political direction from the 
countries that account for 75 percent of emissions; knowing that it is not expected 
to solve, once and for all, all issues; knowing that there will be then a continuing 
political process that will allow for further radical steps as our actions and our 
knowledge become clearer.
Such a way of doing things rests on one fundamental assumption: that the problem 
today is not one of political will; that the political dilemma is not “whether” but “how”. 
There are good grounds for making this assumption. The attitude of countries like China 
and India is no longer: you, the wealthy created this challenge; you can solve it. They 
know climate change is “our” problem not “yours”. How we address it is a matter of 
equity. But the change in climate is the same whether the emissions originate in New 
York or Shanghai. And of course, the most vulnerable to the impact of climate change  
live in the poorest areas of the world.
Likewise, in the US today, there is a broad swathe of consensus that the primary 
responsibility for making near-term reductions in emissions rests with the developed 
world. Opinion in Japan, under PM Fukuda’s leadership, has shifted. In Europe, there  
is a genuine and deep consensus about the need to act.
The challenge is not one of will. It is how to get a deal that sets us clearly on a path to a 
low carbon future; that is fair; and that is do-able. That is radical and realistic. In this report, 
we describe the elements that could go into such a deal and the thinking behind them.
Tony Blair
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A The challenge is immense
There is now virtually overwhelming evidence about climate change and its 
consequences; there remain uncertainties, but the risks of negative and irreversible 
consequences are clearly high. 
•  Over 2,500 scientists from over 100 nations participating in the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in November 2007 that “warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal” and human activity was “very likely” responsible.
•  Recent research indicates that we need to limit warming to approximately 2°C;  
the indications are that moving beyond this level of warming will greatly increase 
the risks of irreversible and potentially catastrophic changes to the climate.
•  In 2005 the atmosphere had a concentration level of carbon dioxide equivalents 
(CO2e, a measure of greenhouse gases) of 55 parts per million by volume (ppmv).  
When the impact of aerosols is taken into account the effective concentration is 
375 ppmv. 
•  To have a reasonable chance of limiting warming to approximately 2°C, we would 
need to peak concentrations at around 75-500 ppmv CO2e (including aerosols), 
and then reduce emissions to stabilise concentrations at 00-50 ppmv by the 
23rd century. 
•  The scientific consensus is that in order to meet such a concentration path for 
CO2e, we need to peak global annual emissions no later than 2020 and then cut 
global annual emissions by at least 50 percent versus 1990 levels by 2050 (1990 is 
the base year for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – 
though there is political contention over the use of this base year). However, 
peaking globally by 2020 requires rapid, major emissions reductions by developed 
countries, and there is doubt, today, whether this can be achieved.
•  In 1990 the world emitted around 0 billion tonnes of CO2e. Today the figure is 
estimated to be 55 billion. Without action this would rise to 60 billion by 2030 and 
85 billion by 2050. In order to meet the 50 percent reduction, we need to take it 
down to less than 20 billion tonnes by 2050.
•  If, as projected, the world population rises to 9 billion people, this would mean an 
average of approximately 2 tonnes of CO2e per person per year by 2050. Today the 
average is 8 tonnes, with over 20 tonnes for the US, 10 tonnes for Europe and Japan, 
6 for China and 2 for India.
•  The implications of all of this are transformative for the world economy; in order  
to cut carbon to this degree and maintain current levels of economic growth, 
carbon productivity (GDP per tonne of carbon) needs to increase tenfold over the  
next four decades. This cannot happen without profound behavioural and 
technological change.
B The challenge can be met
•  We can meet approximately 70 percent of the abatement required over the  
next two decades with existing or near-commercial technologies.
•  Energy efficiency alone could cut energy demand by 20-2 percent and save 
hundreds of billions of dollars per year.
•  There are low-carbon energy sources already in large scale use today that can  
be expanded, e.g., wind, nuclear, and solar.
•  Biofuels, particularly sugarcane-based and next generation lignocellulosic 
biofuels, offer significant potential in transport, but strict policies and incentives 
are needed to ensure they are sustainable, with less impact on food and land use.  
•  There are new technologies that are near to deployment: carbon capture and 
storage (CCS); new transport technologies; new forms of solar; and the use of 
information technologies to monitor energy use. All offer the potential for huge 
reductions in emissions.
•  Preserving the world’s natural carbon sinks, i.e., forests, has massive benefits. 
Deforestation now accounts for 15-20 percent of CO2e emissions.
    Executive Summary 
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C The challenge can be met without damaging the economy
•  Various estimates indicate that abatement will have an impact on the economy,  
but both the IPCC and the Stern Review have found that it is likely to be relatively 
low – significantly less, for example, than the recent oil price rise.
•  Costs would likely be financed by private sector and government borrowing over 
time, and are modest compared to normal capital replacement cycles; thus the 
actual impact on GDP growth in a given year is likely to be minimal or even positive.
•  There will be major investments, creating jobs and business opportunities, in the 
move to a new low-carbon economy. For example, over 2 million people are today 
employed in renewable energy; investment in new environmental technologies 
rose from $10 billion to $66 billion from 1998 to 2007.
•  Trade will be a sensitive issue, but evidence indicates that the impact on trade 
flows is likely to be modest.
•  Experience from past environmental issues such as acid rain and CFCs indicates 
that costs are often overstated; costs in both cases turned out to be less than  
a third of original estimates.
D Addressing climate change leads to energy security
•  Around 50 percent of potential abatement actions – energy efficiency, renewables, 
biofuels, nuclear – result in increased energy security. Other abatement actions 
are mostly energy security neutral and less than 3 percent of potential abatement 
runs counter to energy security.
•  Pursuing energy security without consideration for climate could, however, lead to 
negative climate effects; notably from increased use of coal and energy-intensive 
sources of oil such as tar sands.
•  However, pursuing climate and energy security together would create far more 
diverse energy supplies, greater scope for local energy production, and reduced 
dependence on imported oil and gas.
•  Not addressing climate and energy security increases the risk of future conflict 
resulting from climate effects and resource scarcity. 
E Adaptation will be a necessity, not a choice
•  Climate change is already occurring and will continue to occur even with  
strong action.
•  Over a billion people live in coastal regions prone to flooding, and will likely be 
affected even if radical action is taken.
•  Droughts, shifting agricultural patterns, greater storm intensity, and spread of 
disease areas are all effects that will need to be addressed – particularly for the 
poorest and most vulnerable nations.
•  Insurance will become a major issue, to provide effective safety nets through local 
insurance and global reinsurance systems. New forms of micro-insurance will  
be needed for low-income families.
F  Waiting is risky and expensive
•  The science has become more, not less, alarming on the dangers of climate change 
as time has passed.
•  The longer we wait, the more expensive the reduction will be, the more painful and 
abrupt the economic transformation, and the more we will be required to spend  
on adaptation. Recent US reports have shown that delaying the start of emissions 
reductions from 2010 to 2020 will almost double the annual rate of reductions required.
•  China and India and developing countries will make many of their major energy 
investments over the coming decade. We have a short window of opportunity to 
make that power infrastructure as energy efficient as possible; it will be far more 
expensive to achieve this later.
•  Deforestation has to be reversed – otherwise we will deplete carbon sinks 
irreversibly, requiring us to take more expensive actions elsewhere.
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Given the above, a global deal on climate change is essential. Without it, individual 
countries can act, but the cumulative impact will be much less than concerted action 
within a framework that accelerates the process of change in both developed and 
developing nations. The Bali Action Plan agreed in December 2007 under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides the overall direction  
for the post-Kyoto treaty negotiations that will occur in Copenhagen in December 2009.  
The purpose of this report is to describe the building blocks that need to be in a global 
deal and the research necessary to broaden and deepen our understanding of them  
and how they interrelate. A future report for the 2009 G8 will then try to show how  
these elements could be put together in a coherent deal.
We have identified ten core building blocks for a global deal.
1  The global target
From this, all else flows. There has to be a clear direction given by a global target. There is 
a growing consensus that we need a cut in CO2e emissions of at least 50 percent by 2050. 
There are however different views as to what the baseline should be. The UNFCCC has been 
working off a 1990 baseline, which is the baseline specified in the Kyoto treaty; but there 
are those who want to work off a more recent baseline. The key is that annual emissions 
should be reduced to below 20 billion tonnes by 2050.
Further work
•  How should such a target be expressed? As a percentage versus a baseline  
or as an absolute amount?
•  If a percentage, should the baseline year be 1990, or more recent? What are the 
implications of the baseline year for national targets?
2  An interim target
Leaving it all to 2050 doesn’t allow us to describe the pathway to change or prevent a rise 
in emissions that becomes irreversible. The science says it is critical to constrain the 
date by which global emissions peak.
Further work
• For which date should the target be set – 2020 or later?
•  What should the target for reductions be by that date? What does this require from 
developed nations?
•  Should the target be expressed as an absolute amount? A percentage reduction?  
 A peaking date?
3 Developed world commitments and carbon markets
The developed world needs to start peaking and reducing emissions soon. The primary 
mechanism for achieving this should be a set of binding emissions caps and an international 
carbon market for trading emissions permits. Developed countries should also put 
forward national action plans as to how they will meet their emission cap obligations.  
An important question is what the baseline year should be for the caps. 1990 was agreed 
as the baseline year for the UNFCCC, but much has changed since then.
Further work
• What overall level of reductions should developed countries target?
• What should the process be for determining national caps?
•  How should the national caps be expressed? Absolute reductions or percentage 
off of baseline? If baseline, what year?
•  How should existing and planned national/regional carbon markets be integrated 
into a global market?
•  How should the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) be reformed as a part 
of a carbon market developed at Copenhagen?
• How should the international carbon market be regulated?
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4 Developing world contributions
Bali agreed there should be “common but differentiated” contributions toward meeting 
the global goal from developing nations. There need to be obligations: to work to national 
action plans to abate emissions as far as possible consistent with growth; to peak at a 
certain point; and thereafter to reduce emissions. Meeting these obligations will require 
technology and funding to support them. Developing world mechanisms may also 
include a reformed CDM and “no lose” incentives for energy efficiency and carbon 
productivity improvements at the industry sector level.
Further work
• How are the national action plans to be formed?
• When should developing country emissions peak?
• What reductions are then possible?
•  What additional obligations, with the availability of technology and funding 
support, should developing nations undertake?
•  How to distinguish between rapidly industrialising, less rapidly industrialising  
and very poor nations?
•  What sector-level schemes might provide incentives and investment for deeper 
and more rapid action?
• What other ways might developing nations participate in the carbon market?
5 Sectoral action
A carbon price will be necessary to drive the needed changes but may not be sufficient. 
Action at the industry sector level may also prove an important tool for driving 
transformation. Developed countries may use sector targets as a part of their national 
policies, and one-sided sector-based incentive schemes may help developing countries 
accelerate their efforts. Where similar opportunities exist in many countries, sectoral 
approaches may benefit from international cooperation, and enhance the delivery of 
national targets.
Further work
•  How can sectoral schemes be most effectively used by developed nations  
to deliver cap commitments?
•  How might one-sided sector-based incentive schemes be designed for developing 
countries?
•  In which cases might international cooperation on sectors help countries take  
on and deliver more ambitious targets?
•  Are sector-specific schemes needed for sectors currently outside of national caps, 
e.g., international aviation and shipping (so-called “bunker fuels”)?
6 Financing
The world has a much stronger chance of hitting global targets, and the overall mitigation 
of emissions will ultimately be less costly, if developed nations provide significant funding 
to support accelerated action by developing nations; for technology development and 
deployment; for adaptation; and for halting deforestation. The size of the flows required 
is comparable or larger than current overseas development aid (ODA) flows and will thus 
be challenging to deploy and manage effectively. Some of the funding is needed immediately, 
some over time.
Further work
•  What institutional structures are required to manage large new climate funding 
flows? New institutions versus existing? How can we ensure effectiveness and 
accountability?
•  How can we maximise funding for key technologies, especially CCS, by major 
contributor countries?
•  Can we auction developed country permits as a way of raising money to accelerate 
developing nation action? 
•  How can we ensure that financing for climate issues is incremental to, but 
integrated with, ODA?
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7 Technology
There are certain key technologies that require rapid development to offer medium term 
reductions. The principle one is CCS – without this technology, achieving the targets 
described, will either be unfeasible or significantly more costly. A broad portfolio of 
technology investments is required, including solar, nuclear, sustainable biofuels, IT and 
“smart grid” technologies, as well as basic R&D for the third generation of low-emissions 
technologies. New mechanisms are required to encourage low-emissions technology 
diffusion in developing countries and to reduce barriers to intellectual property access.
Further work
•  How do we accelerate CCS? How do we engage governments and the private  
sector to make the investments required to get CCS to commercial viability and 
widely deployed?
• For countries committed to nuclear, how do we expand nuclear capability?
•  How do we create incentives for and support a broad portfolio of technology 
innovation?
•  How do we integrate technology diffusion in developing countries with overall 
economic development?
•  What is the best intellectual property rights regime for encouraging low-emissions 
technology development and transfer?
8 Forests
There will need to be a specific plan for tackling deforestation. This plan should 
differentiate between the forestry needs of different nations; should have a proper 
system of monitoring; and should develop the incentives to encourage the action 
necessary to stop deforestation.
Further work
•  What are the incentives/obligations necessary to prevent deforestation? 
•  Are market-based incentives feasible and under what circumstances?  Where is 
programmatic funding required?
• What is the right system of monitoring?
• How will funding be raised to support necessary in-country action?
• How can in-country capabilities be built to support forestry efforts?
•  What can be done to encourage economic development that is compatible with 
forest preservation and expansion?
9 Adaptation
Climate change is occurring today and adaptation is required, particularly for the most 
vulnerable countries. Estimates on funding required vary, but it will be significant. We 
should also look at innovative ways in which the private sector can play a role through the 
global insurance market.
Further work
•  What funding will be needed for adaptation by which countries, for what 
applications, and over what time frames?
• What should the sources of this funding be?
•  What institutional mechanisms are required to deliver funding, integrate it  
with development agendas, and ensure effectiveness?
• What role might the insurance industry play?
10 Institutions and mechanisms of action
It is apparent that the scale, complexity, and range of action will require effective 
institutional structures and mechanisms. These can be existing institutions. They can 
be created. They can be partnerships between the private and public sector. We should 
attempt to construct non-traditional and non-bureaucratic means of acting.
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Further work
•  What overall governance structures are required for the actions arising out  
of a new Copenhagen treaty? How can we strengthen the UNFCCC?
•  How centralised should the governance structures be versus a principle of 
subsidiarity? Should there be different, customised solutions to each aspect,  
or one over-arching body?
•  What is the best way of informing and monitoring the overall performance of the 
treaty and its various mechanisms (e.g., carbon markets)?
•  What is the best way of encouraging continued research and development of our 
knowledge base? How can we ensure that growing knowledge is incorporated in 
future target setting and other mechanisms?
•  What is the role of the World Bank, the International Energy Agency (IEA), and other 
multilateral institutions?
•  What role can the private sector play and how can public/private partnerships  
be an instrument of action?
In order to have productive negotiations in Copenhagen, we must be actively working  
on these questions now.
The G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit – with the +5 and others in attendance – and the  
Major Economies Meeting (MEM) chaired by the US offer the chance to agree:
• That these elements should indeed be the building blocks of the global deal.
•  To take certain key decisions now, e.g., the global target of at least 50 percent ; 
funding for CCS development and deployment; and actions to advance the 
concepts of carbon markets and equitable contributions by developing nations.
•  To put in place a process for developing these building blocks in the run-up to the 
Maddalena G8.
• To commission further work.
In that way, the UNFCCC meeting at Poznan at the end of 2008 can move the process 
forward, and the Maddalena Summit in 2009 will be a major opportunity for the G8 to 
build on progress in Hokkaido, provide leadership and create positive momentum in  
the months leading to Copenhagen.
If the G8 nations are committed to take action themselves, transform their economies, 
lead in new technologies, and support the nations of the developing world, then the 
chances of a successful and perhaps even historic outcome in Copenhagen will be 
greatly increased.
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This year and next, the leaders of the world will make fundamental choices as to how 
they will address the risks of climate change. Those choices will be reflected in the 
international treaty that emerges out of the post-Kyoto negotiations in Copenhagen  
in December 2009. That treaty, and the national policies that are committed to as a part 
of it, will play a major role in determining whether or not the world gets onto a path that 
reduces and stabilises greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the coming decade.
The case for action is urgent and clear:
•  There is strong and growing scientific evidence that the risks from unchecked 
emissions are high and potentially irreversible.
•  The evidence is also strong that we can address climate change without damaging 
our economies – we can reduce emissions and grow in both the developed and 
developing world.
•  Addressing climate change will help increase energy security, and ultimately 
international security.
• We must also begin to adapt to climate change already under way.
•  Delaying or taking too little action to reduce emissions will ultimately cost more 
and increase risks.
Emissions growth creates irreversible risks
In November 2007, over 2,500 leading scientists from more than 100 nations 
participating in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that 
“warming of the climate system is unequivocal”.1 The IPCC also concluded that it is “very 
likely”2 that most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the  
mid-20th century is due to the increase in GHG concentration caused by human 
activities. As one prominent scientist has put it, the evidence base is now sufficiently 
strong that those who continue to deny the connection between human activity and 
climate change are in a scientifically similar position to those who deny the link between 
smoking and lung cancer.3 
Concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the largest category of GHG emissions, 
have generally remained in a relatively narrow range for the past 00,000 years, but have 
spiked sharply since the Industrial Revolution (Exhibit 1). The atmosphere we are 
creating now is one that humans as a species have never experienced before. 
    Chap  ter 1 
    Achieving Climate Security
    in an Interdep  endent World
 Exhibit 1 
Concentration of CO2  
is higher now than at  
any time in the past  
400,000 years
Source:
Petit et al (1999, 2001);
IPCC AR4 Synthesis Report (2007); 
Stern (2006)
CO2 concentration, ppmv
650
550
50
350
250
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Climate change is not a distant future risk, but is a phenomenon occurring today.5 Eleven  
of the last twelve years have been the warmest since instrumental records began in 
1850. Around the world sea levels are rising, glaciers are melting, habitats are shifting, 
and weather patterns are changing. Even if we could hold GHG concentrations constant 
at present levels (which would require abrupt and infeasible reductions in emissions), 
the climate would still warm at about 0.1°C per decade for a few decades, and more 
slowly after that for many decades to come.6 
Without action to curb emissions, temperatures could rise anywhere between 2°C  
and 6°C above pre-industrial levels within the lifetime of children being born today 
(temperatures are now about 0.8°C above pre-industrial).7 While these differences  
in temperature may seem small, their impact is likely to be far-reaching. The last time 
the world was  to 6°C cooler, much of the northern hemisphere was buried under ice  
and sea levels were 120 metres lower than today. When the world was 3 to °C warmer, 
sea levels were some 25 metres higher.8 
At temperatures around 2°C warmer, the likely impacts on humans include reduced 
water access for hundreds of millions, major shifts in agricultural production, increased 
damage from storms, coastal flooding, more frequent heat waves causing loss of life, 
the spread of tropical diseases, and 20-30 percent of species at increased risk of 
extinction.9 One only needs think of recent events such as the 2001 droughts in Central 
America, the 2002 floods in Russia, the 2003 heat wave in Europe, the 200 monsoons in 
south Asia, the 2005 Katrina hurricane in the US, and the 2008 record snows in China to 
imagine the potential human and economic costs of more extreme weather patterns 
from a changed climate.10
Furthermore, warming may lead to “tipping points” being crossed which could cause 
abrupt, irreversible or large-scale changes in the climate system.11 At a 1.5 to 2.5°C 
increase in temperature above pre-industrial levels, there is an uncertain but increasing 
risk of the irreversible melting of the Greenland ice sheet and the partial or complete 
disintegration of West Antarctic ice sheet.12 This could raise sea levels anywhere from 5  
to 13 meters over the coming centuries, flooding most of the world’s coastal cities.
Higher temperatures and drought could also cause the collapse of the Amazon rainforest, 
reducing one of the world’s largest terrestrial carbon sinks, leading to a major loss of 
biodiversity and a massive additional increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide.13 Higher 
temperatures could further lead to the release of some of the estimated 500 billion 
tonnes of GHGs currently locked in permafrost at northern latitudes as either carbon 
dioxide or more importantly methane.1 Siberia has already seen a seven times increase 
in carbon release as well as methane bubbling through lakes five times faster than 
previously assumed. A number of studies indicate a high sensitivity to warming and the 
process could become self-reinforcing as temperatures rise, melting more permafrost 
and releasing more GHGs.15
Finally, warming will also inhibit the ability of the oceans to absorb CO2 over time, 
reducing the effectiveness of the planet’s largest carbon sink, as well as acidifying  
the oceans and causing significant damage to marine life.16 
There is a risk that these and other tipping points could cause an acceleration in warming 
to greater than °C. If this occurs we are in uncharted territory. One has to go back over 
65 million years to find a period when the Earth was that warm. The IPCC estimates that 
above 3.5°C, 0 to 70 percent of species on the planet are at risk of extinction.17 
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Mitigating climate risk by stabilising greenhouse gases
Predicting the future of a system as complex as the climate is inherently uncertain. 
There are wide ranges on many of the scientists’ estimates of future effects. But given 
the existence of significant risks of highly negative and irreversible outcomes, the 
appropriate response is to seek to mitigate those risks as effectively and cost efficiently 
as possible.
The evidence shows that climate risk increases significantly when temperatures exceed 
2°C above preindustrial levels.18 The European Union has adopted a target of limiting 
warming to 2°C.19 If we use this as an approximate benchmark, we can then ask what 
GHG concentration level we need to reach to stabilise around the 2°C threshold. 
The relationship between temperature and concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere  
is complex, and GHG levels are not the only factor that drive temperature change. But as 
the IPCC found, most of the observed increase in global average temperature since the 
mid-20th century are very likely due to human-caused increases in atmospheric GHG 
concentrations.20 
Concentrations of GHGs are a stock. Emissions flowing into the atmosphere raise the 
level of the stock, while absorption by the oceans, forests, and other carbon sinks lower 
the level – just as water pouring into a bathtub raises the level, while water flowing down 
the drain lowers it. Currently, the inflows from emissions are much greater than the 
outflows from absorption. Thus the concentration level is rising. In order to stop the rise 
and cause concentration levels to peak, we need to reduce the emission inflows sharply, 
down to the approximate level of absorption outflows.21 In order to go further and 
actually bring concentration levels down from their peak, we will need to cut still more 
steeply, and have a period where the emissions inflows are less than the absorption 
outflows. The goal of policy then should be to use a combination of emissions cuts and 
strategies for preserving or expanding carbon sinks to create a path for stabilising 
atmospheric concentrations at a level that reduces climate risk to an acceptable level.
Research estimates that we would have a good chance of staying below 2°C if we were to 
peak concentrations of CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalents, a standard measure of greenhouse 
gases) at approximately 75 ppmv (parts per million by volume, taking into account the 
impact of aerosols and other effects) by around 2050, and then decline to 00 ppmv in the 
23rd century.22 Unfortunately, however, we are fast approaching the point beyond which 
we would be unable to achieve this with current technologies and without excessive costs. 
The IPCC’s best estimate is that CO2e concentrations were at 55 ppmv in 2005, although 
when the impact of aerosols are taken into account, then the effective concentration is 
375 ppmv.23 The implications of the scientific evidence are that if we take urgent action 
now, we might be able to achieve a path of atmospheric concentrations peaking at around 
75-500 ppmv by 2050 and then gradually declining to 00-50 ppmv by the 23rd century.2 
Under such a scenario, we would have an increased risk of exceeding 2°C versus a 00 ppmv 
stabilisation path, but it would still give us a reasonable chance of avoiding the worst 
effects of climate change. 
If we take a long-term stabilisation path of 50 ppmv as the upper limit of acceptable risk, 
then global annual CO2e emissions will need to peak no later than 2020 and then drop at 
least below 50 percent of 1990 levels by 2050 (targets are often expressed versus 1990, 
the base year for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – UNFCCC). If annual 
emissions do not peak by 2020, it would not be possible to find a 50 ppmv emission 
pathway without far more radical cuts (or even negative net emissions) in the future.25 
Exhibit 2 illustrates a potential pathway consistent with these guidelines.26 
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We can then translate these percentage reductions into annual emissions figures. 
Today, the world emits approximately 55 billion tonnes of CO2e per year (billions of 
tonnes are also sometimes referred to as “gigatons”).27 The power sector accounts for  
the biggest share at around 26 percent according to IPCC estimates, with industry at 19 
percent, forestry 17 percent, agriculture 1 percent and transport 13 percent (Exhibit 3). 
  Exhibit 3
GHG emissions by sector
Source: 
IPCC, AR4 Synthesis Report, 2007, 
p.36; Kahn et al., 2007, pp.325, 333; 
Bernstein et al., 2007, pp.461, 467
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At the country level, a recent Dutch study of CO2 emissions puts China as the world’s 
biggest emitter accounting for around 2 percent of the global total, with the US at 21 
percent, the EU-15 at 12 percent, India 8 percent and the Russian Federation 6 percent.28 
Together these regions make up more than 70 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions.
 
* Developing = UNFCCC Non Annex 1 ** Developed = UNFCCC Annex 1
  Exhibit 2
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Without action, global GHG emissions are likely to grow to over 60 billion tonnes by 2030 
and to 85 billion tonnes by 2050 (Exhibit ).29 If we are to move onto the stabilisation pathway 
described above, then at a global level we need to:
• By 2020 – peak CO2e emissions.
• By 2030 – cut annual emissions to below 35 billion tonnes.
• By 2050 – cut annual emissions to below 20 billion tonnes.30 
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Another way to think about this is that in 2005 emissions were about 8 tonnes per person 
per year. Advanced economies ranged from 10 tonnes per person for Japan and the EU, 
to 23 for Canada (Exhibit 5). Developing countries range from very small amounts for the 
poorest countries to under 2 tonnes per person for India and 6 for China. Assuming the 
emissions cuts above and world population growth to 9 billion people, such a scenario 
implies a world average of approximately 2 tonnes per person by 2050.31
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Abating carbon and pursuing economic growth
Just as there is a large body of evidence on the risks of climate change, there is also a 
large body of evidence on what we can do about it. There is a growing consensus that 
emissions can be reduced without damaging prosperity in either the developed or 
developing world. Reducing emissions will require a transformation of our economies, 
but not giving up on growth.
The challenge is to transform our energy sources, technologies, infrastructure, 
institutions and behaviours, in ways that dramatically increase the carbon productivity 
of the economy. Carbon productivity is the amount of GDP produced per tonne of carbon 
emitted. Carbon productivity can be thought of in a similar way as labour productivity 
(GDP per hour worked) or capital productivity (GDP per amount of capital). The world’s 
carbon productivity today is about $70 per tonne of CO2e. If we are to keep world 
economic growth on its current course of 3.1 percent per year in real terms and meet a 
50 ppmv stabilisation goal, carbon productivity needs to increase by 5.6 percent per 
year to $7,300 per tonne of CO2e by 2050 – a tenfold increase over the next four decades 
(Exhibit 6).32 The question is: how to do we achieve this goal?
*  Global Insight GDP forecast to 2037, extrapolated to 2050.
  Exhibit 6
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Finding the largest and lowest cost sources of emissions reduction
A first step to answering this question is to look at all of the possible options for abating 
carbon with existing technologies, or with near-commercial technologies whose 
performance can be assessed, and ask how much carbon can be abated and at what 
cost. The potential actions can then be stacked up from least cost to highest cost 
creating a “cost curve” for CO2e abatement (Exhibit 7).33 The horizontal axis shows the 
abatement opportunities, ordered from least cost on the left to higher cost on the right, 
with the width of the bars showing the amount of potential abatement, and the height 
the average cost per tonne. The lowest cost options are then the ones most likely to 
increase carbon productivity and thus should be the top priorities for action. 
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The cost curve provides 
a “map” of abatement 
opportunities
Cost of abatement,  
2030, €/tonne CO2e
Source:
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One of the key ideas in addressing climate change is that in order to establish incentives  
to reduce emissions, we need to create a price for emitting greenhouse gases, a so-
called “carbon price”. Creating a price for emissions and a market for emissions trading 
is at the heart of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and the 
envisioned Copenhagen agreement that we will discuss in the next chapter. The cost 
curve shows that at a carbon price of €0 ($8) per tonne of CO2e, there could be 
sufficient incentive to abate 27 billion tonnes of CO2e versus a “business as usual” 
scenario by 2030, thus coming close to meeting the target pathway described above.
There are a number of conclusions that emerge from the cost curve analysis:
•  Overall abatement costs are reasonable and can be achieved for a total cost to  
the world economy of €500 billion to €1,100 billion ($600 billion to $1,325 billion)  
per year in 2030, or from 0.6 to 1. percent of that year’s projected GDP.3 However, 
the costs may well turn out to be less as a result of economic gains through new 
technology.
•  Over 70 percent of this level of abatement can be achieved with technologies that 
are available today and the remainder with near-commercial technologies that 
would likely be deployed during this time frame.
•  There is no one answer to abating carbon; rather, success will require a wide variety 
of actions across all industry sectors and geographies.
•  Approximately a quarter of the abatement potential, or 7 billion tonnes, can be 
achieved at a negative cost to society (the left side of the graph). In other words 
these opportunities would yield a positive investment return, largely due to cost 
savings from reduced energy use.35 
•  While the developed world and China will play a critical role, as they are responsible 
for about two thirds of total emissions today, over 0 percent of the abatement 
opportunities under €0 ($8) per tonne are in the developing world excluding 
China. We therefore cannot achieve long-run, cost-effective mitigation without  
the participation of the developing world.
Ways and means to a low-carbon economy
The cost curve provides a roadmap for raising carbon productivity by reducing emissions 
with a minimal impact on growth. The important point is: already within our grasp, or 
nearly so, we have the ways and means of achieving significant improvements in carbon 
productivity and reductions in carbon dependence. We can group the actions into 
different categories:36
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Capturing the energy efficiency opportunity
Analysis by the McKinsey Global Institute suggests that by 2020 energy use could be  
cut by 20 to 2 percent, and 7.9 billion tonnes of CO2e could be saved, through energy 
efficiency investments that would more than pay for themselves. Large untapped 
efficiency opportunities exist in the residential and commercial buildings sectors (e.g., 
building insulation, lighting, appliances, heating and air conditioning), industry (e.g., 
more efficient motors and manufacturing processes), and transport (e.g., vehicle fuel 
efficiency – see below). Capturing these opportunities globally would require additional 
annual investments of $170 billion, but annual energy savings would ramp up over time to 
generate over $900 billion in annual savings by 2020 – a 17 percent annual rate of return.38 
The prospect of permanently higher energy prices is already strengthening private and 
public sector incentives for greater energy efficiency (Box 1). High energy prices create 
an opportunity for governments to accelerate the transition to a more energy efficient 
economy. 
Companies cut carbon and save $11.6 billion in energy costs
In 2005 a combined $11.6 billion in energy cost savings was reported by 3 companies, 
achieved largely through energy efficiency measures. Four of these companies – Bayer, 
BT, DuPont and Norske Canada – achieved absolute GHG emissions reductions of more 
than 60 percent while saving $ billion in energy costs. A further 21 companies achieved 
GHG cuts of 25 percent. Johnson & Johnson, for example, cut its CO2 emissions by 22 
percent from 2003 to 2006 due largely to energy efficiency measures, while growing 
annual revenues by 27 percent – an improvement in carbon productivity of 6 percent.39 
Woking Borough (UK) cuts energy use in half
Between 1990 and 200, Woking Borough Council achieved a 77 percent reduction in  
CO2 emissions and a 51 percent reduction in energy consumption in council buildings. 
These dramatic reductions were achieved through a range of initiatives, including building 
a combined heat and power energy station, introducing energy-efficient lighting, setting 
up energy management systems in buildings, and using solar energy to power pay-and-
display parking meters. The Council is also helping local residents and businesses to 
reduce emissions through a public-private energy service company (ESCO).0 
Japan’s Top-Runner Programme Increases Energy Efficiency
Japan’s “Top-Runner” programme has delivered impressive energy efficiency 
improvements in a number of product categories ranging from computers to fluorescent 
lights. Within each product category, the best-in-class is used to construct an efficiency 
standard which all manufacturers must meet. During the first phase, energy efficiency 
improved well above expectations in many product categories, with the energy efficiency 
of petrol-fueled passenger vehicles improving by 23 percent, refrigerators by 55 percent, 
and room air conditioners by 68 percent.1 
 Box 1
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De-carbonising energy supplies
Overall, low-emissions sources account for only 19 percent of total energy provision 
today, and most of that is from nuclear, hydro, and waste-to-energy sources. While 
renewables and biofuels have been growing quickly, they still only account for 1 percent 
of global power generation and 1 percent of transport fuel demand, respectively.2 
If the world continues to grow at recent levels, end-use energy demand will increase by 
55 percent by 2030 – with 7 percent of the increase from developing countries.3 Under 
virtually all credible scenarios, coal will still be a major part of the global energy supply 
mix for decades to come. In addition to energy efficiency, there are four further critical 
areas for action if the world is to decarbonise energy sources at the required pace over 
the next 20-30 years (Exhibit 8) – a period during which there will be massive new-build 
in the power sector around the world:
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•  Carbon Capture and Storage 
  A critical and urgent priority is accelerating the development of carbon capture  
and storage (CCS) for coal-fired power plants and other carbon-intensive industrial 
processes. The largest and fastest growing source of CO2 emissions in the coming 
decades will be emissions from coal-fired power stations in China, India and the 
US.5 For example, the IEA projects that between now and 2030 China will invest in 
1,312 gigawatts of new electricity capacity, 70 percent of which will be based on 
coal.6 Under optimistic assumptions, this new coal-based capacity alone will 
commit China to 5 billion tonnes of increased annual CO2 emissions by 2030 – more 
than today’s total EU CO2 emissions.7 It will be very challenging, if not impossible, 
to hit significant abatement targets without CCS. The Zero Emissions in Power 
(ZEP) group in Europe has highlighted the need for 10-12 demonstration plants to 
be running before 2015 in order to prove the technology at full operational scale. 
ZEP have estimated the cost of such a project at €6-10 billion.8 If the technology is 
proven at scale, Massachusetts Institute Of Technology estimates that it should 
then be economic at a carbon price above $30 per tonne.9 Widespread deployment 
will then involve massive infrastructure investments – the pipelines required to 
transport gaseous or liquefied carbon dioxide to sequestration would rival the 
existing natural gas and oil transport infrastructure.
•  Renewables
  There is significant potential to expand the supply of renewable energy sources 
(e.g., wind, solar, biomass, tidal). Overall, the IEA estimates that under a mitigation 
scenario with reduction of CO2 emissions by 50 percent from current levels by 2050, 
renewables would account for 6 percent of global power generation, primarily 
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from wind, solar and biomass.50 However, achieving this level of penetration will 
require investment incentives to drive scale, lower costs, and improve performance. 
High oil prices and carbon pricing would help make renewable technologies cost-
competitive. For example, at an oil price of $80 per barrel and a carbon price of $30 
per tonne, on-shore wind becomes cost competitive with combined cycle gas 
turbine plants and could multiply its installed capacity five times to 35 gigawatts 
by 2015, or 8 percent of the world total.51 Likewise, a number of solar technologies 
become cost competitive with sufficiently high energy and carbon prices.
•  Nuclear
  Nuclear currently provides about 7 percent of global energy demand and about  
17 percent of total electricity generation. It is an established low emissions 
technology capable of producing large amounts of base-load power. Nuclear costs 
are in many circumstances competitive with coal today at about $8 to $58 per 
MWh for nuclear, versus about $1 to $59 for coal.52 If a carbon price is introduced, 
raising the costs of coal, then nuclear will become even more relatively competitive. 
However, nuclear remains controversial in many countries and there are uncertainties 
around long-term de-commissioning and waste disposal costs, as well as 
concerns over nuclear proliferation and security issues.
•  Coal to gas substitution
  Modern combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants emit 60 percent less carbon  
per MWh than coal-fired power. In regions with access to secure gas supplies, this 
provides another avenue for emissions reduction that could amount to 310 million 
tonnes of CO2e per year in aggregate.53 However, the economics depend on the 
price of natural gas relative to coal, the existence of a credible long term carbon 
price, and the cost of CCS for coal and gas plants. The emissions from CCGT, while 
lower than coal, are higher than coal combined with CCS, nuclear, and renewables.5 
Overall, it is clear that there will be no single answer to de-carbonising energy supplies. 
However, with the right combination of incentives (e.g., carbon price, feed-in tariffs, 
renewable subsidies) and with substantial investments in development and deployment 
over the coming decades, it will be possible to create a portfolio of energy supplies that 
cuts power-sector CO2 emissions by 71 percent compared to 2005 by 2050, while increasing 
electricity production by 132 percent – an eightfold reduction in emissions intensity.55
Reducing emissions from transport
Overall the transport sector accounted for 13 percent of total CO2e emissions in 200.56 
There are three strategies for reducing transport emissions:
•  Demand reduction
  Strategies include improved mass transport and better urban planning (Box 2), 
road pricing schemes, reducing weight of shipped goods, redesign of supply chains 
to account for a carbon price (less goods transported and shorter distances), video 
conference substitution for business travel, and other measures.
•  Fuel efficiency
  For vehicles, strategies include reducing weight, more efficient engines, and better 
aerodynamics. Using these techniques, prototypes for one popular model reduced 
emissions from 176 g/km to 99 g/km, a  percent reduction.57 Hybrid vehicle 
technology also continues to advance. For shipping there is potential from more 
efficient engines and hull designs, as well as supplementary power from wind (e.g., 
rigid, composite sails) and solar sources. Aviation has already seen significant fuel 
efficiency gains of 20 percent over the past decade58, due to high fuel costs as a 
percentage of operating costs. More efficiencies are possible, though fewer 
breakthroughs are likely.
• Biofuels and other fuel substitution
  Biofuels have an important immediate role in tackling GHG emissions, but they are 
unlikely to displace the entire global fuel supply. The IEA estimates that biofuels 
will deliver 6 percent of transport fuels by 2030, although targets of 10 percent by 
2020 in several countries will accelerate their use.59 They must therefore be 
combined with the policies above as well as technologies such as electric and 
hydrogen vehicles where low-carbon energy sources are available. Not all biofuels 
are sustainable – their environmental, social and economic impacts depend on how 
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 Box 2 
and where they are grown and produced. Policies to promote their development 
and use must incentivise production methods with the lowest GHG emissions 
across the supply chain and end use. In addition policies are needed to reduce 
wider environmental and social impacts such as water availability, biodiversity, 
food prices. Current food-based biofuels can deliver significant reductions in GHG 
emissions, particularly sugarcane and wheat ethanol. Future biofuels offer greatly 
improved performance, with higher yields per hectare and lower environmental 
and social impacts. Such biofuels include ethanol and biodiesel from lignocellulose 
sources such as agricultural and forestry residues, and fast growing grasses that 
can be grown on marginal land. However, these are still early in their commercial 
development with the first plants currently being built. 
Sustainable Urban Planning in Curitiba (Brazil)
The city of Curitiba has used integrated urban planning to develop into an 
environmentally sustainable city. The city government has focused particularly on 
planning transport, housing and land-use to cut pollution and improve the environment. 
Since 1970, residents have planted 1.5 million trees along city streets. Curitiba now has 
the lowest per capita gasoline consumption in Brazil, thanks to the popularity of its 
public transport network. Since 197, traffic in the city has declined by 30 percent while 
population has doubled.61 
Changing behaviours and decisions
To a large extent, carbon emissions are the product of billions of decisions made by 
individual managers and consumers around the world every day. Shifting to a low-
carbon economy will require that consumers change what they buy, and managers what 
they sell and how they provide their goods and services. As carbon has historically been 
free, neither consumers nor producers have taken it into account in their decision 
making. A combination of a carbon price and other measures such as energy efficiency 
standards, feed-in tariffs, and renewable incentives will be required to start ensuring 
that carbon impact enters into those decisions. Better information and product labelling 
will be required to help consumers make low-carbon choices. Both governments and the 
private sector can also help change social norms around carbon use, just as social 
norms have changed around smoking.
Behavioural changes can make a significant difference. For example, a major retailer 
and several consumer goods companies have worked together to shift consumers to 
“concentrated” laundry detergents with the same cleaning function, but a lower 
environmental impact. The initiative has thus far saved 00 million gallons of water, 95 
million pounds of plastic resin, and 125 million pounds of cardboard, and such products 
have 20 percent lower CO2 emissions through their lifecycle.62 These companies have 
also educated consumers to lower washing temperatures, saving further energy and 
emissions. All of this has been achieved with no loss for consumers or the companies – 
only a reduction in wasted energy and carbon.
Preserving and expanding the world’s natural carbon sinks
Every year, about 13 million hectares of forests – an area equivalent to the size of Greece 
– are destroyed. In addition, another 2. million hectares are affected by degradation in 
tropical regions.63 Brazil and Indonesia alone account for about 35 to 0 percent of net 
forest area lost in 2000 to 2005.6 Forecasts of deforestation rates vary, but according to 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment scenarios, 200 to 90 million hectares of forest 
area could be lost in the developing world by 2050, some 5 to 12 percent of the current 
total.65 Deforestation causes significant GHG emissions – an estimated 7.6 billion tonnes 
of CO2 per year in 2000, about 15 to 20 percent of all GHG emissions.66 
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There are some encouraging examples of forest preservation. Brazilian pulp and paper 
company Grupo ORSA has for five years managed the world’s largest private tropical 
forest, just over half the size of Belgium. One-third of the forest is harvested just under 
the natural regeneration rate and trees are felled and transported so as to cause minimal 
harm. The efforts are certified by the Forest Stewardship Council every six months.68 
Accelerating the development and deployment of next generation technologies
The technologies discussed thus far and included in the cost curve are all either 
commercially available today or “near-commercial”. With the appropriate incentives, in 
particular a carbon price, and investment from both public and private sector sources, 
one can fully expect that improvements in existing technologies would accelerate and 
new technologies would be developed. In the first quarter of 2008, even without a global 
carbon price and limited incentives, venture capitalists from around the world put more 
than $1 billion of investment into clean energy technologies.69 Investment in renewable 
energy went up from $10 billion to $66 billion from 1998 to 2007.70 Although the pace of 
development and ultimate impact is inherently unpredictable, there is a “next 
generation” of technology under development today with significant potential (Box 3).
Promising Technologies
Combining carbon capture and biofuel production with algae
Algae can potentially be used in carbon capture and biofuels. Unlike some biofuel 
sources, it can be cultivated without competing with food crops for agricultural land, 
and generates high yields per hectare. Yields are enhanced when algae is fed with 
carbon dioxide emissions from power stations or factories, generating over 100,000 
litres of fuel per hectare each year compared to 6,000 litres per hectare from sugarcane, 
and 3,000 litres per hectare from corn. In pilot installations algae has absorbed up  
to 0 percent of CO2 from emissions. Algae can also be grown in non-agricultural 
environments such as artificial ponds, tubes and on flat plates, thus avoiding 
competition for land with crops or forests. In addition to government-funded research,  
a significant number of companies are investing in algae including BP, ENI, Shell, E.ON, 
Chevron, Honeywell Aerospace and Greenfuel Technologies Corporation.71 
There is still much debate about the abatement potential from forests – through reduced 
deforestation, afforestation, and forest management – though even the low end of the 
range is large. Regional bottom-up estimates for forestry mitigation potential range from 
1.3 to .2 billion tonnes of CO2 per year by 2030 at a carbon price of up to $100 per tonne CO2, 
with half of that potential achievable at a price of under $20 per tonne CO2. Global top-down 
models estimate a mitigation potential of 9 - 1 billion tonnes CO2 per year (Exhibit 9).67 
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Concentrated solar power (CSP)
CSP installations covering just 1 percent of the world’s deserts, if appropriately linked  
to demand centres, could theoretically meet the entire world’s electricity demand in 
2030.72 This technology uses reflectors to concentrate sunlight and generate heat, which 
drives steam or gas turbines to generate electricity. The heat can also be stored more 
efficiently than electricity; CSP installations can therefore generate power at night as 
well as day. But before CSP can be deployed at scale, the costs need to come down 
substantially – current forecast electricity costs for plants under construction is  
$125-$225 per MWh. The US Department of Energy has set a goal of CSP becoming cost 
competitive by 2020, versus high-carbon base-load power. The industry sees this as 
achievable if 5,000 MW of capacity is built globally. CSP also has other uses, ranging 
from direct heating and cooling for buildings, to water desalination and hydrogen fuel 
cell production.73 
Smart grids
“Smart grid” systems could substantially reduce energy losses across the transmission 
network (accounting for about 7 percent of all power generation in OECD countries and 
for 10 percent or more in other regions), enable a more distributed and intermittent (i.e., 
renewables-friendly) approach to power generation, and facilitate the cross-border 
integration of power markets (making it easier to export low-carbon energy from sources 
such as solar and off-shore wind).7 Smart grids combined with smart meters also have 
the ability to smooth demand by switching off water heaters and other non-time-critical 
loads for short periods, in return for a lower tariff.
Information and communications technologies (ICT)
ICT could enable emission abatements of 7.8 billion tonnes of CO2e by 2020, mostly 
through improved energy efficiency. ICT can enable energy efficient building design 
through modelling and simulating energy consumption.75 Buildings are being constructed 
with smart “Building Management Systems” which improve energy efficiency by 
continuously monitoring the building (e.g., movements, weather) and adapting lighting, 
heating and air-conditioning in real time. Other examples of ICT-enabled abatement 
include road charging and traffic flow monitoring, automation of industrial processes, 
teleworking, and video-conferencing.
A new model of growth
The science tells us what the risks are. Economists, technologists, and business leaders 
tell us what can be done. The key question then is the cost of transition to this new low-
carbon economy, and the wider economic and social impacts. Specifically:
1 What will be the impact on growth?
2 What will be the impact on jobs?
3 What will be the effect on international competitiveness?
 Who will the winners and losers be, and how can we treat the losers fairly?
Clearly, the answers to these questions will be different from one country to the next, 
depending on the stage of industrialisation, the starting position in terms of the carbon-
intensity of their power sector, and population density. Some countries, such as Japan, 
have built a comparative advantage in energy efficiency programmes, which could be 
exported to the world. Others, such as Sweden, benefit from low-carbon power sectors 
and could (in principle) be pioneers in electric transport. Russia and France continue to 
develop new nuclear power technologies. Brazil, on the other hand, has built up the world’s 
leading biofuels economy. Germany has the world’s largest concentration of wind power. 
While Costa Rica has taken on the task of creating a growth model which preserves 
rainforests and increases afforestation. All of these “national experiments” are building 
the evidence base for how to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. But the 
questions about growth, jobs, competitiveness and costs are still all on the table.
Impact on Growth
The IPCC surveyed a broad range of studies on the costs of mitigation and found 
estimates ranging from a 1 percent gain to a 5.5 percent decrease in global GDP by  
2050.76 Stabilisation at 5 – 535 ppmv slowed GDP growth by 0.12 percent per year. 
Such a difference in annual growth rates is in the “noise level” for most economic 
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forecasts – that is, other general economic factors such as interest rates, inflation,  
and the ups and downs of the business cycle are likely to play a far greater role in future 
economic performance than even an aggressive programme of emissions reduction.
It is also important to note that of the scenarios surveyed by the IPCC, the majority were 
assessed before the recent run-up in energy prices and make assumptions about future 
energy costs that look low by current standards. Thus on a relative basis, the impact on 
growth may be even lower than shown by these studies.
To put these costs into perspective:
•  On average, the US spent about 6 percent of GDP per year on defence during the 
Cold War (1950-1990)77 
• Today, the world spends about 3 percent of GDP per year on insurance.
•  The estimated global cost of the US sub-prime crisis for the financial sector is 
potentially up to 2 percent of GDP.78 
•  The estimated global cost of oil increasing from $0 bbl to $130 bbl from June 200 
to June 2008 is about 5 percent of GDP.79 
If one looks at these cost scenarios over time, one sees that there is very little overall 
difference in economic performance between a business-as-usual economy and an 
economy transitioning to a low-carbon path (Exhibit 10). Under business-as-usual 
assumptions world GDP per capita will grow from $5,900 today to $15,900 by 2050. 
Estimates for a low-carbon scenario in 2050 range from $15,000 to $15,600 GDP per 
capita. Thus even in a low-carbon world, people would likely be 2.5 times richer than  
they are today.
The impact will differ country by country, but there is no significant evidence that a low-
carbon economy is a barrier to growth. For example, US GDP per capita would multiply by 
1.7 times between now and 200 under a low-carbon scenario versus 1.78 under 
business as usual.80 China would see its GDP per capita multiply by 6.9 times by 200 
under a low-carbon scenario versus 7.2 times under business as usual.81 The key 
message is that for most families in most countries, the costs of transitioning to a low-
carbon economy will be modest compared to the impact of other economic factors such 
as energy prices, interest rates, food and healthcare costs, and the ups and downs of 
the business cycle.82 What these families will notice, however, is the impact of storms, 
flooding, higher food prices, and the spread of disease if we do not take action.
  Exhibit 10
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Why costs are less than feared
There are four reasons why the costs of transition to a low carbon economy are lower 
than might be imagined. First, the energy and capital infrastructure of the world 
economy turns over and is replaced every few decades. The world spends $10.6 trillion 
per year on capital investment. Shifting this infrastructure to low-carbon technologies 
will involve some incremental costs, but much of the money would be spent anyway in 
the course of normal investment – the incremental costs relative to total infrastructure 
costs are not large. For example, McKinsey estimates that the incremental cost for the 
US would be $1.1 trillion through to 2030 – while this sounds large, it is only 1.5 percent  
of the $77 trillion in projected real investment during this same period.83 Second, as  
noted before, many mitigation actions have positive economic returns due to energy 
cost savings. Third, also as mentioned before, most of the technologies are commercial 
or near-commercial today: it is largely a matter of creating incentives through a carbon 
price and other measures to encourage their development and deployment. And fourth, 
many changes require shifts in consumer and management behaviour, but little actual cost.
Furthermore, most of the above scenarios make a stringent assumption that mitigation 
costs are paid for in the year they are incurred. More realistically, much of the 
incremental cost will be financed over time. This is appropriate given that much of the 
investment would be in long-lived assets. A power company investing in a new CCS or 
solar power plant would likely borrow the money to pay for it, just as it borrows to pay  
for coal plants today. The amounts involved for developed countries would be easily 
financeable. The US, for example, would have no difficulty financing the $50 billion per 
year in incremental investment required through its $56 trillion capital market.
If the transition to a low-carbon economy is financed over time, then GDP growth may 
actually accelerate, not slow. The new investment to build CCS power plants, renewable 
energy sources, energy efficient buildings, low-carbon vehicles, and so on, would all 
boost output and create jobs. If the incremental costs are financed, then there would be 
little offsetting reduction in consumption of other goods and services; overall GDP would 
therefore increase.
Finally, history suggests that the costs predicted today are likely to overestimate  
the actual costs.8 This is because it is very difficult to predict the response to changed 
incentives such as a carbon price, and the pace of technological innovation. For 
example, in 1988 economists estimated the cost to the United States of a 50 percent  
cut in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) at $21 billion (Exhibit 11). By 1990, after two years of 
operation under the Montreal Protocol, the estimated cost for a 100 percent cut  
dropped to $2.7 billion – 87 percent less than the original estimate for double the 
abatement. Similarly, estimates for the annual costs of the US SO2 (acid rain) cap-and-
trade program prior to launch in 1995 ranged from $3 billion to $25 billion. As of 2007, 
estimates for the actual long-term costs range from $1 billion to $1. billion – between 
53 percent and 9 percent less than the original projection. CFC and US SO2 abatement 
were significantly smaller-scale problems than global carbon abatement. But the  
same principle – that it is impossible to see all of the innovation and cost reduction 
opportunities in advance – is likely to hold for carbon as well.
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Impact on Jobs 
There is an argument that the low-carbon economy will cost the world jobs. The evidence 
suggests that the low-carbon economy is likely to create more jobs than it will destroy. 
Clearly, there are some high-carbon industry sectors that will be adversely affected. 
However, there are also many examples of companies growing and creating employment 
in low-carbon sectors (Box ):
1  Renewables already employ at least 2.3 million people globally and 170,000 jobs 
were created in 2006 alone.85 
2  In China, it is estimated that the renewables sector already employs almost a million 
people, over 60 percent of them in solar thermal manufacturing and services.86 
3  In India, biomass gasification is estimated to have potential for creating about 
900,000 jobs by 2025 in gasifier stove manufacturing, biomass production and 
processing, supply chain operations, and after-sales services.87 
  In Germany, 25,000 jobs were created and 116,000 more saved during the first half  
of this decade in a home retrofit project by the German Alliance for Work and the 
Environment, a collaborative effort by the government, unions, NGOs and 
employer federations.88 
The crucial question, however, is the net effect on employment, and there is evidence 
that this can be positive. A research group at the University of California, Berkeley 
modelled a scenario where 20 percent of US electricity demand in 200 was covered  
by renewables (solar, biomass, and wind) by 2020 and found that this would lead to the 
net creation of 78,000 to 102,000 additional jobs (depending on the shares of different 
renewables) – an increase of 91 to 119 percent compared to a situation where that 
demand was covered by coal or natural gas.89 
Broad Air Conditioning (China) 
As incomes rise in the developing world, the demand for air conditioning is exploding, 
creating a new source of GHG emissions. Broad Air Conditioning, a Chinese company, 
sells air conditioning units that result in less CO2 emissions than conventional units and 
are up to twice as energy-efficient. The technology behind this is “nonelectric 
refrigeration”, in which a liquid is heated, boiled and then cooled so the vapours 
condense and cool their surroundings. The unit can be fuelled by local energy sources 
such as natural gas, avoiding increasing peak loads on the electricity grid. Broad Air 
Conditioning has had significant success in China and other developing countries 
achieving sales of $300 million in 2006; it employs 2,000 people, and is growing globally. 
The company estimates that over the years, it has helped save over 18 million tonnes in 
CO2 emissions – an amount comparable to Bahrain’s emissions in 2005 – and over $12.5 
billion of investment in power stations.90 
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Impact on International Competitiveness
A third concern relates to the risk that some high-carbon, traded sectors such as steel, 
plastics, cement, glass or aluminium will be unfairly affected by carbon regulation that 
would be stricter for developed economies than in middle- or low-income countries. 
Differential carbon regimes would not only distort competition, but could result in 
production and jobs leaking to low-carbon regimes, thus undermining both economic 
and climate policy goals.
In some cases, this is a legitimate concern, and any global carbon regime will have to find  
a way to address it. It is, however, worth noting that:
1  The most likely affected sectors represent a small share of global GDP and of jobs 
– in the US, for example, 3 percent of GDP and less than 2 percent of jobs.91 
2  Only a relatively small share of imports is likely to be affected. For example in the 
aluminium and steel sectors, only 3 percent and 7 percent respectively of imports 
to the US come from China. Canada and Europe are the largest source of carbon 
intensive imports into the US, and would likely be covered similarly under any 
climate treaty.92
3  There are other factors (such as technology development, changing consumption 
patterns, access to primary resources, primary energy costs) which may have a 
much bigger impact on industry structure and competitive dynamics than the 
precise specification of the carbon regime.
Also, other studies have found that differences in environmental regulations are a 
relatively minor factor in production location decisions compared with factors such as 
access to skilled labour, technology, and customers. Detailed country-by-country and 
industry-by-industry studies have found little evidence that a carbon price could trigger 
potential major shifts in production.93 
This is not to say that there will be no trade impact from an international regime on GHG 
emissions. Rather, that the impact of any such regime is likely to be modest compared to 
general trade and economic issues, and can be managed through existing or modified 
trade adjustment mechanisms.
Encouraging winners, helping those displaced
There will be some losers, as well as winners, from the low-carbon economy, just as 
there have been from the much bigger economic dislocations resulting from technology 
change, globalisation, and the recent sharp rise in energy prices. Given the ongoing 
restructuring of the global economy over the past 30 years, much is known about the 
best interventions to help smooth adjustments to new economic realities. They involve 
targeted interventions to stimulate new uses for existing assets, to accelerate skills 
retraining for affected workers, to stimulate R&D, and to encourage the creation of new 
growth engines rather than protecting sunset industries. There is every reason to believe 
that such approaches can be adapted to the transition challenges of adjusting to a low-
carbon economy. 
We may also need to adjust our perceptions of who is likely to “win” and who is likely to 
“lose”. Consider just one example. The introduction of carbon capture and storage 
technology in the US will require the investment in a pipeline and storage infrastructure, 
roughly the size of the existing oil and gas sector. Not only will steel companies benefit 
hugely from a sustained phase of increased investment demand, but the oil and gas 
sector may find opportunities too. Many of the same core skills used to extract and 
transport oil and natural gas would be used to transport and store carbon. In fact, it may 
be that the “high-carbon sectors” of our economy, with their experience with energy 
technologies and infrastructure construction and management, end up benefitting 
rather than losing from the transition.
In many ways, the transition to a low-carbon economy would be similar to other major 
economic transformations. Both the Industrial Revolution and the Information Technology 
Revolution were “expensive” in that they involved lots of new investment in infrastructure 
and technology – but they both also drove growth and major improvements in people’s 
lives. When we look back in 25 years time, there is a good chance that we will see the low-
carbon revolution in much the same way as we see the internet today – creating entire new 
industries and enhancing the rate of productivity growth across the economy as a whole.
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Increasing energy security and international security
With rapidly growing global demand for energy, questions about the long-term future  
of supplies, and the concentration of oil and gas deposits in some of the most politically 
unstable parts of the world, increasing energy security has risen to the top of many 
national agendas. We now have an enormous opportunity to align the energy security 
and climate security agendas.
If one looks at the changes to the energy sector that GHG abatement requires, 97 
percent of carbon mitigation either supports greater energy security, or at worst is 
neutral on energy security.9 About 50 percent of potential abatement actions such as 
energy efficiency measures, increased renewables, use of domestic biofuels, nuclear, 
and biomass power generation result in increased energy security. Approximately 7 
percent of abatement, including CCS, forestry, agriculture, and imported biofuels, is 
neutral to energy security concerns. The only significant abatement lever that would 
decrease energy security is substituting natural gas for coal, but that accounts for only  
3 percent of potential abatement.
Addressing climate change would thus be overwhelmingly positive for increasing energy 
security. However, the logic does not work in reverse – pursuing energy security is not 
automatically good for climate change. If domestic coal is substituted for imported oil 
and gas, that could increase annual CO2e emissions by 0.6 billion tonnes globally. Likewise, 
if more coal is liquefied, again to substitute for oil and gas imports, that could increase 
emissions a further 0.6 to 1.2 billion tonnes.95 
It is critical, therefore, that the energy security and climate security agendas are 
pursued together. Energy security pursued in isolation could result in accelerated 
climate change. But thoughtful policies to address climate change will result in greater 
energy independence, greater diversity of supply, and less economic exposure to 
volatile oil and gas prices – a win-win for both climate and energy security.
Greater energy independence would have particular benefits for the developing world, 
whose citizens are often the most negatively affected by energy price increases. A 
transition to a low-carbon economy could significantly enhance developing world 
access to energy, especially in rural areas where over 2 billion of the world’s poorest 
people live and work. Many of the new energy technologies (e.g., wind, solar, biofuels, 
combined heat and power) can be deployed in a much more decentralised, “local energy 
loop” fashion. This decentralisation of energy could provide the basis for a profound 
increase in rural productivity, helping to alleviate poverty and, at the same time, to slow 
down urbanisation to a more manageable pace.
Finally, we can view addressing climate change as a priority to improve international 
security. Military planners are increasingly beginning to see climate change as a 
potential source of national security risks. A panel of eleven of the most senior retired 
generals and admirals in the US recently concluded that “global climate change presents 
a serious national security threat which could impact Americans at home, impact United 
States military operations and heighten global tensions”.96 This is not a theoretical 
future threat – the UN estimates that all but one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian 
aid in 2007 were climate related.97 Some have called Darfur the world’s first climate war.
In a recent report on climate change and international security, the European High 
Representative and European Commission concluded “climate change is best viewed  
as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions, and instabilities.”98  
The report identified seven specific security threats presented by climate change:
1 Conflict over resources
2 Risk to coastal cities and infrastructure
3 Loss of territory and border disputes
 Environmentally-induced migration
5 Situations of fragility and radicalisation
6 Tensions over energy supply
7 Pressure on international governance
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If we do not take action on climate change, it is almost certain that part of the  
adaptation cost we will have to pay will be increased defence and other national  
security expenditures, as well as the human costs of climate-related conflict.
Adapting to existing and future climate change
While the agenda outlined in this chapter would drive substantial mitigation, even if  
the world was to take radical action now, ongoing temperature rises and momentum  
in the climate system mean that we will almost certainly see significant, adverse climate 
change over the coming decades.99 We must develop and implement a programme to 
systematically begin adapting to the changes that are likely to come.
Billions of people will be affected by climate change. Studies show that it will be the 
poorest and most vulnerable people who will bear the brunt of the impact, but wealthy 
countries will not be immune either.100 More than a sixth of the world’s population live in 
glacier or snowmelt-fed river basins, where water supplies are likely to become more 
erratic. Over a billion people currently live in coastal regions, a population which could 
grow to over 5 billion by 2080 and will be significantly threatened by rises in sea level. 
While water availability may increase in higher latitudes and wet tropics, semi-arid areas 
like the Mediterranean Basin, western US and southern Africa are likely to become drier, 
and droughts will increase.101 
A whole range of strategies from building improved coastal defences to developing 
drought-resistant crops will be needed to help the people and communities affected by 
climate change already under way. There must be much more serious consideration of 
the risks involved in building on flood plains, and of the need to halt deforestation to prevent 
flooding. Communities most at risk from extreme weather must be helped to put in place 
systems to warn their citizens, as is happening in Bangladesh. Effective safety nets must 
be provided through both local insurance systems and global reinsurance models. In 
addition we need new forms of “micro-insurance” for lower-income families. 
There is still a wide range of estimates of the costs of adaptation – from tens to hundreds 
of billions of dollars per annum in additional investment that is incremental to “business 
as usual” financial flows and existing overseas development aid.102 One thing is certain – 
the longer we fail to address the challenge of reducing carbon emissions, the higher the 
costs of adaptation will be, and we will face more changes in climate that cannot be 
adapted to.
Waiting is both risky and expensive
Critics in the climate change debate have noted that while the scenarios described in this 
chapter are indeed sobering, there is much uncertainty about the future evolution of the 
climate and our impact on it. They maintain that it is also possible that while the planet 
will get warmer, the changes will not be nearly as dramatic as those described. 
Forecasting the future of a system as complex as the climate is an inherently uncertain 
exercise. The reports of the IPCC are couched in appropriately cautious terms and note 
where there is debate over evidence and key uncertainties in forecasts. Critics argue 
that the costs of addressing climate change will be expensive, certain, and near-term, 
while the risks are uncertain and longer-term. Therefore, they argue, we should wait to 
act until we have more certainty over climate effects and until the costs of low-emissions 
technologies are lower. There are six problems with this argument, however:
First, the science so far has tended to err on the side of conservatism. In general,  
as scientists have learned more about this issue, the results have become more 
concerning, not less. For example, the 2007 IPCC report significantly raised the  
threat level from the previous 2001 report.103 
Second, by the time we have certainty it will be too late. By the time temperatures rise 
above 2°C and we begin to see the impact of such warming, it may be too late to reverse 
it. The climate system has significant momentum to it, and the tipping points described 
before are such that we cannot wait until they are reached. 
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Third, the longer we wait, the more expensive reducing emissions will be. There will be less 
time for businesses and consumers to adjust; more infrastructure must be changed out 
before the end of its lifecycle; and the abatement path will have to be steeper. For example, 
studies have shown that delaying the start of emissions reductions from 2010 to 2020 
could almost double the annual rate of reductions required (Exhibit 12).10 Furthermore, 
delaying action will reduce the incentives to develop and deploy new technologies, thus 
raising the overall costs of mitigation. 
  Exhibit 12
Urgent action is needed  
to avoid deeper cuts in  
the future
Pathways for global 
emissions that would 
yield at least a 50 percent 
chance of avoiding  
2°C warming
Source:
Keohane and Goldmark (2008)
70
60
50
0
30
20
10
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 200 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Annual global emissions, billion tonnes CO2e
Delaying the start date  
increases the required  
annual rate of reductions
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2030 200
5.7% Equal to entire US
electric power sector
 2.%   3.3%   1.3% 1.8%
16.6%
6.1%
Business as usual
Fourth, as emerging markets in China, India, Russia, Brazil, and the Middle East enjoy 
rapid growth, they will make major investments in power generation, transport systems, 
industry, buildings, and other infrastructure over the coming decade. Once it is built, 
much of that infrastructure will have a long lifetime and be expensive to replace. The 
world has a short window of opportunity to determine whether that infrastructure is 
built using low- or high-emissions technologies. These countries already account for one 
third of emissions today and their emissions are growing at .3 percent per year.105 If that 
infrastructure is built with high-emissions technology, then a significant overshoot is 
more likely and returning to a 50 ppmv path will be far more expensive, if possible at all.
Fifth, it is important to note that waiting may require steeper and more expensive reductions 
because of degradations in the world’s carbon sinks. As temperatures rise, the ability of 
the oceans to absorb CO2 declines, and the world is also losing a large amount of forest 
cover each year. As carbon sinks decline, the amount of annual reduction will have to increase 
by an equivalent amount.
Sixth, and finally, the longer we wait, the greater and more expensive the adaptation challenge 
will be. Almost all studies show that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”. 
The potential damage from climate change and costs of adaptation rise significantly the 
longer we delay action on mitigation. 
Waiting to take action on climate change will neither reduce the uncertainties nor reduce 
the costs of acting. Delay will only increase risks and costs. It is prudent to act now.
      *  *  *
Necessity is often the mother of invention. The world needs to develop and implement  
a new model of low-carbon growth. This will require new technologies, institutions, 
incentives, and cultural norms – at the community, national and global level. There is 
real change needed and real costs involved. However, the costs are manageable and the 
potential benefits are huge – new sources of economic growth, increased energy and 
international security, new opportunities for both the developed and developing world, 
and a healthier, cleaner planet.
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But realising these benefits and managing the costs will require a concerted global 
effort through well designed policies. There is a risk that poorly designed climate policies 
will either be insufficient to address the problem, or impose excessive economic costs, 
particularly on those least able to afford it. The challenge – addressed in the next chapter 
– is how to get those policies right and to create the basis for effective collective action.
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    Chap  ter 2
    Develop  ing the Framework 
    for a Global Deal
When negotiators sit down in Copenhagen in December 2009, they will face one of the 
most formidable political challenges in recent history. They must build on the strengths, 
as well as address the weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol, to create a successor treaty 
that will be agreed to, ratified, and enacted by 191 countries to take firm and decisive 
joint action on climate change. That is why this year’s G8, under the leadership of Japan, 
is so important.
Over the past 15 years, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) and its Kyoto Protocol have established a number of precedents that will inform 
the Copenhagen negotiations.  Furthermore, in December 2007 in Bali, Indonesia, the 
member nations of the UNFCCC agreed on a roadmap to prepare for the negotiations. 
Taken together, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Bali roadmap establish four principles 
that provide a starting point for Copenhagen. First, the recognition that countries should 
take action “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities”. In other words, developed countries  
need to lead by committing to binding absolute emission reductions, while developing 
countries also need to make equitable contributions to help reduce global emissions. 
Second, a commitment to market mechanisms for abating carbon – specifically to a 
“cap-and-trade” system that creates a global carbon market. Third, that finance needs 
to flow from developed to developing countries to support mitigation and adaptation 
efforts. And fourth, that actions should be “measurable, reportable and verifiable,” and 
for binding commitments for developed countries, enforcement mechanisms are required. 
In deepening our application of these principles, we must learn from both the strengths 
and weaknesses of the existing treaties and protocols.
But beyond these general principles, much will be on the table in the months leading  
up to Copenhagen. 
What success in Copenhagen would look like
In Copenhagen negotiators will undoubtedly walk into the room influenced by the wider 
global economy, their interpretation of the lessons from Kyoto, their view on the science, 
perceptions of fairness, their domestic political processes, and beliefs about inter-
generational equity. 
But despite the natural diversity of these starting points, there is a common set of interests 
that will bind all of the participating nations together. At the highest level, there are the 
shared goals of abating global carbon emissions while preserving economic growth. 
Building on these two over-arching objectives, we can outline a set of more specific 
goals. A successful outcome in Copenhagen would:
•  Launch actions that lead to tangible changes in energy production, industry, and 
consumer behaviour, rapidly putting the world on a path to peak emissions within 
the next 10–15 years at the latest, followed by deep reductions consistent with 
scientific evidence about the maximum “safe” concentrations of CO2e.
•  Begin the process of adapting the world’s infrastructure, human systems,  
and institutions to climate change already under way, particularly in the most 
vulnerable nations.
•  Enable all member nations to fulfill their aspirations for economic prosperity and 
energy security.
•  Reflect the differential starting positions of countries which, because they are  
at varying stages of development, are likely to have (a) radically different 
economically viable pathways to stabilising and then reducing CO2e emissions;  
(b) different potential costs of carbon abatement; (c) different levels of financial 
resources to make the transition; (d) different abatement challenges in the context 
of their wider development goals; (e) different levels of institutional capability; and 
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(f) different levels of historic responsibility for the current level of CO2e concentration.
•  Provide strong incentives for countries to stretch their level of commitment over 
time and join a widening circle of nations pursuing low-carbon growth.
•  Create opportunities for effective global action through expanded international 
flows of financial resources, technology, trade in low-carbon goods and services, 
and scientific, technical, and policy expertise.
•  Respond to new evidence from scientists, economists, technology experts, policy 
specialists, and others on the risks, costs, and effectiveness of responses – above 
all, Copenhagen should not be a static treaty, but rather one that creates institutions 
and policies that evolve as our knowledge of this hugely complex issue evolves.
The remainder of this chapter will consider how policy leaders can, over the coming 18 
months, reconcile the agenda of Copenhagen with this vision for success. Given the 
political and technical complexities of the issues, this is not very much time. Thus the 
goal of this chapter is to build on the Bali roadmap to help governments focus their 
deliberations on the key issues, as well as support the academic, NGO, business, and 
policy communities in their efforts to inform this debate.
We will discuss ten building blocks for the Copenhagen agenda that will be fundamental 
to achieving an effective, economically efficient, and fair treaty:
1 The global target
2 An interim target
3 Developed world commitments and carbon market mechanisms
 Developing world contributions
5 Sectoral action
6 Financing
7 Technology
8 Forests
9 Adaptation
10 Institutions and mechanisms for action
1  The global target
A global long-term 2050 target provides an essential context for discussing the other 
elements of the global climate deal and serves as a yardstick for setting policies and 
assessing the success of efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. 
Issues
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a strong scientific consensus that the world 
needs to cut GHG emissions by at least 50 percent relative to 1990 by 2050, though this 
baseline remains an issue of significant political contention.1 This would translate into 
annual emissions of less than 20 billion tonnes of CO2e in 2050 – a 6 percent reduction 
from today’s estimated level of 55 billion tonnes. In principle, such a reduction, if 
combined with emissions peaking by 2020 and further reductions beyond 2050 for a 
century or more, would put emissions on a path to significantly reduce the risks from 
climate change versus the path we are on today. 
It is important to note, however, that even though such a target would significantly reduce 
our risks, it would far from eliminate them. A 50 percent cut in emissions is at the lower 
end of the 50 to 85 percent range that the IPCC suggests would be needed. At that target 
level there is still a sizeable chance that temperatures would rise more than 2°C, leaving 
the potential for far more catastrophic risks.
Further work and choices
Bearing in mind that the global target will shape other items under negotiation, amongst 
the key issues that governments will have to resolve before final agreement can be reached 
in Copenhagen are:
•  How should the target be expressed (e.g., percentage versus base year, absolute 
reduction, temperature, concentration level)?
•  If a percentage, should the baseline year be 1990 or more recent? What are the 
implications of the baseline year for national targets?
•  Should the target make any reference to distributional equity? For example, 20 
billion tonnes globally could also imply approximately 2 tonnes per capita by 2050.2 
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•  What are the institutional mechanisms necessary to create confidence that the 
target will be met, so helping reduce uncertainty for governments and businesses 
making long-term decisions?
•  What is the process for adjusting the target if scientific or economic knowledge 
changes significantly?
2  An interim target
While a long-term target sets the overall context, an interim target, or targets, will 
ensure that we are on the right pathway and will send clear short- and medium-term 
investment signals. 
Issues
Given there will be almost four decades between the treaty going into effect and 2050, 
there obviously needs to be a pathway to 2050. This raises the question of an interim 
target. As discussed in the previous chapter, most long-term emissions reduction 
scenarios show emissions rising in the near-term, peaking, then falling. Thus one approach 
is to call for emissions to peak by a certain date. For example, Exhibit 2 (shown in chapter 1) 
portrays a scenario where global emissions peak by 2020 and then fall to 50 percent 
versus 1990 by 2050.
Some might say that a big cut in emissions by 2020 by the developed world is too steep  
a prospect – it is too soon. The problem with an alternative that sets a less demanding 
interim goal is that it might not sufficiently constrain peak emissions. If the peak is higher 
and or later (e.g., 2025), then to keep temperatures from rising too high, emissions would 
have to be cut more steeply later (e.g., deeper than 50 percent by 2050).
Another approach would be to use a series of five year commitment periods (a Kyoto 
mechanism), e.g., 2013-2017, 2018-2022, and so on, measuring average emissions during 
those periods. An initial global path could be established in Copenhagen and then reviewed 
at the end of each five year commitment period based on performance and current science 
and economic evidence.
The key is to set a path to the global 2050 target that is both realistic and consistent with 
climate risks at an acceptable level, and then to create a set of institutional and interim 
targeting mechanisms to constrain the parties to that path.
Further work and choices
The interim target will have to combine a series of factors:
• What is the right interim target date – 2020 or later?
•  How should the interim target be expressed? Percentage versus baseline year? 
Which year? Absolute reduction?
•  What are the implications of the interim target for other provisions of the deal  
(e.g., developed country reductions, evolution of developing country commitments)?
• What are the further interim targets that should be examined?
•  As with the long-term goal, what is the process that can update target(s) as 
progress is made and more knowledge is gained?
3 Developed world commitments and carbon market mechanisms
It is widely accepted that industrialised countries will have to take the lead by 
committing to absolute emissions reductions beyond those agreed under Kyoto, linked 
to the contributions made by developing countries. Essential to delivering on these 
commitments will be the role of carbon market mechanisms backed by national action 
plans. Many countries will have national markets, all will participate in the global market.
Issues
Setting developed country caps
Given that developed countries are largely responsible for the climate problem 
(approximately 70-80 percent of the cumulative stock of CO2 created between 1850  
and 2002 was emitted by the developed world)3 and have the most financial and 
technological resources to address it, the UNFCCC established the principle  
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that they should take the lead in reducing emissions. In the Kyoto Protocol, developed 
countries committed to national binding emissions caps aggregating to 5 percent below 
1990 levels by 2012. Individual country caps ranged from +10 percent to -8 percent.
It is also expected that in Copenhagen, developed countries will commit to binding 
national caps assessed over five year commitment periods. However, the developed 
country reductions recommended by the IPCC are now significantly steeper than those 
agreed in Kyoto – 25 to 0 percent versus 1990 by 2020, and 80 to 95 percent by 2050 
(Exhibit 2, shown previously, provides an illustration of what the less-aggressive end of 
this range might look like). Such targets would require a significant and rapid deviation 
from current rates of emissions growth. For example, US emissions have grown 16 
percent over the past fifteen years, and to meet this target range they would have to fall 
by 35-8 percent over the next 12 years.5 Likewise, Japanese emissions have risen 7 percent 
over the past 15 years and would have to fall 30- percent over the coming 12 years.6 
Thus the same questions about defining and setting long-term and interim global targets 
also apply to the cap for the group of developed countries. Specific national caps would 
then be determined through an assessment of the mitigation potential, costs, and 
capabilities for each country, and ultimately through negotiation.
Developed country action plans
It will also be essential for the credibility of these targets that they are backed up  
by national action plans that lay out specific strategies for meeting cap commitments. 
Such plans are usually discussed in the context of developing countries, but could also 
be a valuable tool in helping developed countries assess their mitigation strategies, and 
would provide further transparency and information to participants in the carbon 
market. The plans, for example, would show what mechanisms are being employed in 
pursuit of reductions (e.g., national cap and trade system, national sector plans), what 
efforts are being made to develop and deploy technologies, emissions projection 
scenarios, and so on.
Defining “developed countries”
There is a further question as to which countries should be included in the “developed” 
group. The world has clearly changed since the Annex I list of developed countries was 
established in 1992, and the Kyoto Annex B list in 1997. Thus a critical question will be 
which countries, and by what criteria, will be assuming binding national caps under a 
Copenhagen agreement.
Establishing carbon markets
A key feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it enables countries under cap commitments 
to trade emissions permits with each other. Thus a country over its cap can buy permits 
from a country under its cap. Such a cap-and-trade system significantly reduces 
mitigation costs by enabling countries to seek emission reduction opportunities 
wherever they are least expensive. It is likely that Copenhagen would build on and  
extend this system.
Exhibit 13 provides an illustration of how such a system might work, with trading of 
emissions permits between developed countries (denoted A, B, and C). In the diagram 
country A is a net buyer of permits because such purchases from other countries are 
less expensive than taking the same mitigation domestically. Some of the developed 
countries in the system may have national carbon markets as well (A and B), while some 
may not (C). Developing countries also participate in the market. For example, country D 
is participating in an updated version of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM – see 
below), while country E is participating in a “no lose” sectoral scheme (see section 5). 
Intermediaries such as brokers, banks, and market makers might also participate, as 
could private and public sector investors.
A growing number of national governments and regions have or are considering national 
cap and trade systems, e.g., the EU ETS, proposed systems in the US and Australia, and 
Japan’s recently announced “Fukuda Vision” to launch an emissions trading scheme by 
autumn 2008. Such systems have the potential to be a highly effective policy tool for 
achieving national targets; however, a critical question is how they might be integrated 
into a global carbon market. Studies estimate that a truly global carbon market could  
cut abatement costs by 50 percent.7 
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A further question is whether international trading should remain country-to-country,  
or whether the global system should evolve to company-to-company trading (company-
to-company trading currently occurs within national or regional systems). International 
company-to-company trading would create a more liquid market and reduce costs, but 
would also reduce government control over meeting cap commitments. There is an 
analogy to the evolution of the global currency markets. Until the 1970s, currency trades 
were largely carried out country-to-country. With the fall of capital controls in many 
economies, currency trading between companies and individuals grew rapidly. This 
created a truly global market and greatly increased economic efficiency, but reduced 
national control over exchange rates and reserves. Just as international currency 
markets have needed to develop national and international institutional structures  
and regulatory regimes as they have globalised, so too would carbon markets.
Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism
Finally, another key element of the Kyoto market is a feature that enables developed 
countries to obtain emissions credits by investing in abatement projects in developing 
countries – the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM). As the cost curve in the 
previous chapter showed, over 0 percent of low-cost abatement opportunities are  
in the developing world. The CDM is a win-win in that developing countries benefit  
from investment flows while developed countries get access to lower cost abatement 
opportunities than they might have in their domestic markets alone.
The complexities of administering the CDM have, however, limited its ability to scale  
up and the investment flows it has stimulated have been a modest $7. billion to date.8  
This is a small fraction of the financial flows that are needed. There have also been 
questions about the quality of the avoided emissions it generates. Thus another key 
issue for Copenhagen is whether and how to reform CDM to enable it to scale better  
and ensure quality.
Further work and choices
There is a complex negotiation under way to determine the level of developed country 
targets, the comparability of targets, and the means to achieve those targets. This 
negotiation includes carbon market mechanisms, the inclusion of land-use change and 
forestry within each country, and other technical issues. In Bali, Kyoto Party developed 
countries decided to use the 25 to 0 percent reduction range (by 2020), identified in  
the IPCC, as guidance for the level of ambition of the group.
How a post-Kyoto global 
carbon market might work
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The most important choices are:
•  What is the level of effort that each developed country is prepared to undertake 
within the 2020 timeframe? There is a range of linked issues including the base year 
and the end date of the target. While five year commitment periods are useful to 
ensure countries are on track, longer periods, out to 2020 and beyond, are important 
to send clear signals to the markets. 
•  What is the basis for determining caps, given different levels of carbon productivity 
across those countries?
•  Might national action plans be a useful tool for helping developed countries ensure 
delivery against their commitments? What would be in such plans? Would they be 
required or simply encouraged? How would they be reviewed and by whom?
•  How should the carbon markets work? How can we ensure national schemes are 
compatible with a Copenhagen market and together evolve into a truly global market?
•  How should we define “developed countries”? By what criteria? Should the list 
evolve as countries progress to “developed” status?
•  What is the extent to which countries can meet their targets through purchasing 
carbon reductions from developing economies? 
•  How should the CDM mechanism be reformed? How can investment flows and 
emissions reductions be scaled up dramatically without diluting the quality of 
emissions credits?
•  What are the enforcement mechanisms that would be most effective in the case  
of non-compliance?
•  What is the mechanism to review targets and set future targets beyond 2020, 
noting the rapid developments in climate science and speed of transition to a  
low carbon economy?
4 Developing world contributions
Alongside emissions reductions by industrialised countries, developing countries will 
need to contribute to slowing the growth of, and cutting, emissions. These contributions 
– and their timeframe – will need to reflect differential shares of emissions and capacities, 
and the incentives that can be provided. Undertakings to make these contributions 
should be specified in national action plans. 
Issues 
While the principle that developed countries must lead is generally accepted, it is also clear 
that dangerous levels of climate change will not be avoided without strong action by 
developing countries. Over half of current emissions come from developing countries and 
are growing rapidly. As illustrated in Exhibit 2, if developed countries begin cutting immediately, 
developing countries can continue to grow emissions for another decade, but then would 
need to see emissions peak in order for global emissions meet a target of 50 percent by 
2050. The IPCC has said that developing countries, particularly in Latin America, the Middle 
East, and East Asia, need to achieve “substantial deviations from baseline” by 2020.9 
At present, national caps are not on the table for developing countries as they would be 
viewed as an unfair burden on countries which have less historical responsibility for the 
problem; poorer citizens who aspire to the living standards of the developed world; and 
fewer financial and other resources to transform their economies. Nonetheless, most 
developing countries recognise the role they must play to help address the climate issue, 
and the risks they run if climate change is not addressed – it is the poorest countries who 
would likely suffer the most. Thus other tools are required to help developing countries 
make equitable contributions to emissions mitigation.
The approach envisioned in the Bali roadmap is “Nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner.”10 One could imagine that such “nationally appropriate 
actions” could be specified in national action plans. Such plans would detail specific 
investments and actions for a given country to increase carbon productivity and develop 
sustainably. The plans would provide a basis for partnership between a developing country 
(where emissions reductions will take place) and the industrialised countries that will be 
providing financial, technological, capacity-building and other support for those 
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reductions. The plans would be eligible for significant levels of co-funding (or in the  
case of the poorest countries, complete funding) over and above current overseas 
development aid (ODA).
One of the critical debates is whether the group of developing countries should be segmented 
in some way with gradations of effort. It is clear that a middle income country such as 
Chile is in a different position from a large, rapidly developing country such as China, 
which in turn is in a different position from a small impoverished nation such as Burkina 
Faso. There are various proposals for segmenting countries where the least developed 
nations would not be required to take on any efforts to reduce emissions as they neither 
contribute greatly to the problem nor have the resources to reduce emissions. At the other 
end of the spectrum there is a group of rapidly industrialising nations that would be expected 
to do more, although with financial and technological support from developed countries.11 
A related issue is whether, how, and when middle income and rapidly industrialising countries 
might move from making “equitable contributions” to undertaking binding national caps. 
Some have proposed schemes whereby countries automatically graduate if they reach 
certain development criteria. Others have proposed that developing country contributions 
become commitments over time to encourage emissions peaking by 2020-2030. But some 
developing countries believe it is inappropriate for them to take on firm commitments 
until the developed countries deliver on their commitments between now and 2020.
In addition to national action plans, many developing countries would likely participate 
in the CDM (see section 3) and some countries might participate in sector incentive 
schemes (see section 5). An important question is what other mechanisms and funding 
flows need to be created to encourage and support ambitious action by developing countries. 
The goal is to create a set of incentives to unleash creativity, competition and ambition, 
transforming developing countries into innovators for a low carbon economy.
Further work and choices
In the area of developing country contributions, the most important choices are:
•  How to differentiate between developing countries in both level of effort and type 
of contribution?
•  What is the appropriate level of effort that each rapidly developing country 
undertakes in its national action plan? Countries could include national policies 
and measures such as renewable energy and energy efficiency targets or sectoral 
commitments.
•  How do we implement the measurable, reportable and verifiable clauses of the Bali 
Action Plan? What might this mean in the context of national action plans?
•  What are the types of mechanisms and funds that will best support developing 
country efforts and increase the level of ambition of those efforts – i.e., that will 
accelerate their transition to a low-carbon economy?
•  In which year and by what criteria do countries graduate from contributions to 
commitments, in particular into a regime of binding caps? What is the monitoring, 
measuring and review system needed for developing countries, coupled with the 
support to develop and implement such systems?
5 Sectoral actions
The term “sectors” is used in a variety of ways in the Copenhagen context. Some 
developed countries might choose to use sectoral approaches as a part of their national 
policies to help them deliver on their commitments under a carbon cap. There are also 
proposals for one-sided “no-lose” incentive schemes for developing countries to 
achieve energy efficiency or carbon productivity targets for high emitting sectors (e.g., 
power). Finally, questions have been raised as to whether international agreements 
might make sense for certain sectors.
Issues
National-level strategies on sectors may be a useful tool for ensuring abatement 
performance, particularly for countries with strong industrial planning traditions, or for 
highly regulated sectors (e.g., again, power). However, it is important that these be seen 
as a policy for supporting national caps (not a replacement) and are used as a complementary 
tool for achieving those caps, along with carbon markets and other mechanisms.
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One-sided “no-lose” sector incentives for developing countries offer the potential to 
scale up investment flows and abatement beyond what can be achieved with project-
based CDM. Such incentives could reward improvements in energy efficiency, carbon 
productivity, or actions to de-carbonise energy sources; they could take the form of 
emissions credits to be sold on the carbon market, or cash payments. A sectoral scheme 
based on emissions credits would in effect create incentives for developing country 
sectors to “join” the global carbon market. The key issues are (a) administering such 
schemes; (b) ensuring that achieving the targets translates into real emissions reductions; 
and (c) ensuring the flow of credits does not become so large that the price in the carbon 
market collapses.
The idea of international sector agreements is more controversial. International sector 
agreements have been discussed as a vehicle for ensuring comparability of effort between 
developed and developing countries and creating a level playing field for trade. For 
example, an international agreement might set some common goals for energy efficiency 
or carbon productivity in steel, aluminium, or cement. This would help ensure some 
degree of convergence on low-carbon production methods, even though each sector is 
spread across developed and developing countries. Some developed countries, however, 
express concern that international sector agreements could be used as a substitute for 
or to weaken national caps. Some developing countries, on the other hand, express concern 
that such agreements would in effect put much of their economies under a binding cap 
before it is fair or practicable to do so.
There may, however, be benefits if countries pursuing sector schemes (either as national 
policy or as part of an incentive mechanism) have some degree of international coordination. 
Examples might include sharing data on sector performance, cooperating on industry 
best practice, or sharing technologies that enable sector targets to be met. There is, however, 
one sector that may be a candidate for a specific international agreement. International 
aviation and shipping (so-called “bunker fuels”) are not currently covered under Kyoto. 
The fact that their emissions occur in international skies and waters makes them challenging 
to include in a national cap and trade scheme.
Further work and choices
•  How might national sector schemes be used by some developed countries to 
support delivery of their national cap commitments?
•  How might a scheme for one-sided sector incentives work for developing 
countries? What would be the criteria for eligibility? What would the incentives be? 
How would such a scheme be administered? How would we address potential 
impacts on the carbon price?
• What types of international cooperation might be beneficial for sector schemes?
• What should be the plan for bunker fuels?
6 Financing
There will need to be funding for developing country action plans, technology diffusion, 
deforestation and for adaptation .
Issues
In addition to the financial flows towards GHG abatement that will be stimulated by 
carbon markets, CDM, sector schemes, and other policies designed to drive private 
sector investment, there are a number of areas where additional investments will be 
needed, largely in developing countries. A successful outcome in Copenhagen will 
depend on the ability to create mechanisms that enable these investments to take  
place in a predictable way at the scale needed.
There is increasing work to estimate the scale of these flows, though there remain 
significant uncertainties around them. The UNFCCC recently estimated that by 2030 
developing countries would need $19 billion a year for building upgrades, $1 billion for 
low-carbon industrial production, $36 billion for transport, $28 billion for agriculture, 
plus an additional sum for research and development.12 Forestry is estimated to require 
$20 billion (see section 8 below), and adaptation up to $67 billion (section 9).13 These 
flows would be in addition to the investments stimulated by carbon markets – though 
the faster carbon markets expand and the higher the price of carbon, the less non-
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market funding will be required. The funding would also be over and above existing 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).
The critical questions are how such funds are to be raised and disbursed. There are three 
options for sources of funds. First, a portion of the developed country cap could be carved 
out and the permits auctioned. Auctioning a small proportion of the permits would 
potentially cover the above funding needs, be linked to the emissions that cause climate 
change, and not be a direct drain on government budgets. The EU ETS and US legislation 
are both considering carbon auctions as a method for raising funds. The second option is 
a levy on developed country emissions or carbon trading transactions (Kyoto currently 
has such a levy on CDM transactions). Finally, countries could simply increase their ODA 
budgets, though the required amount makes this unlikely to be feasible on its own. In all 
likelihood, a mix of all three sources will be required.
The flows envisioned are significantly larger than those handled by multilateral 
institutions today. New institutions will need to be created to handle the flows, close 
partnerships forged with existing institutions, and new creative mechanisms developed 
for working with the private sector. Furthermore, many countries lack the institutions 
and capabilities to handle the large financing flows required and ensure they are 
effectively used. National institution and capability building will thus be critical 
prerequisites for effective funding use.
Further work and choices
•  What are the funding levels required by country and application (e.g., mitigation, 
adaptation)?
•  What is the potential for each of the three funding options and issues associated 
with each?
•  What institutional structures are required for collecting and distributing funds 
(e.g., a general fund for all Copenhagen monies or multiple funds), as well as 
funding governance and accountability?
•  Would the funding impact be maximised by flows through new institutions, versus 
partnering with existing institutions, versus private sector institutions?
•  How do we create vehicles for national capability building to make effective use  
of funds?
7 Technology
Innovation and technology are crucial for achieving low-carbon development. A new 
approach to innovation is required in order to develop and deploy new technologies and 
business models within a given timeframe to avoid carbon lock-in. Action should be 
centred on harnessing the power of markets to drive innovation, but international 
cooperation will also be needed to capture the global public good aspects of low carbon 
innovation and enhance the diffusion of low-carbon technologies to developing countries. 
Governments must also accelerate the development of critical technologies, in 
particular carbon capture and storage.
Issues
The vast majority of technology investments will be made by the private sector and the 
critical policy for stimulating those investments will be a robust carbon price. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, at a carbon price above $30, a number of low-emissions technologies 
begin to become cost competitive. But carbon markets alone will not be enough. There 
are four areas where complementary policies and international cooperation in Copenhagen 
could potentially further accelerate technology development and diffusion.
1  Market expansion
  Policies such as energy efficiency standards, utility feed-in tariffs, and government 
purchasing policies can all expand markets for low-carbon technologies, helping 
drive them down learning curves and reducing their costs. The Copenhagen 
process should consider how international coordination on such policies could 
accelerate technology development (e.g., an international energy efficiency effort 
modelled on the Japanese “Top-Runner” programme).
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2 R&D funding
  International funding could be applied to technologies that need to be accelerated 
to meet mitigation goals (e.g., CCS, solar CSP), that require significant public  
 infrastructure investments (again CCS), or public regulatory involvement (e.g., 
nuclear), as well as funding for basic R&D that private sector companies have less 
incentive to invest in. 
3 Diffusion funding and assistance for developing countries
  Provide assistance in acquiring technologies on a commercial basis and building 
capabilities to use those technologies; studies of technology diffusion in 
developing countries show that such efforts need to be tightly integrated with 
broader development efforts.1 Recent examples include the launch by US, UK, and 
Japan of what is intended to become a $30 billion fund to support deployment of 
low-emissions technologies in developing countries.15 India has also proposed a 
collaborative network of R&D institutes from developed and developing countries 
for research on energy efficiency and clean technologies (Cleanet initiative).16 
4 Removal of barriers to diffusion
  For example, subsidies for high-emissions technologies, tariffs on low-emissions 
technologies, and anti-competitive intellectual property (IP) practices (e.g., 
discriminatory pricing).
On the issue of IP, there are some who would go further than just removing anti-
competitive barriers and have proposed an international “protect and share” 
arrangement. Under such a framework, there would be government-to-government 
commitments to “protect and share” low carbon technologies and encourage joint-
ventures and public-private partnerships. Support would be made available under the 
R&D and diffusion funds to strengthen IP protection measures in developing countries. 
Any countries that were found to not robustly protect low-carbon IP would risk having 
their access to the R&D and diffusion funds blocked. Such a framework would use 
technology roadmaps to identify critical technologies and establish licensing criteria 
that encourage rapid diffusion.
Further work and choices 
•  What is the feasibility of creating an international energy efficiency programme 
modelled on principles similar to Japan’s Top-Runner programme (see chapter 1)?
•  How do we identify priority technology funding needs and establish funding 
mechanisms to meet those needs?
•  What is the best way of providing diffusion funding and assistance that is closely 
integrated with overall sustainable development agendas?
•  What is the potential impact of IP schemes such as “protect and share” on 
technology diffusion and IP creator incentives?
8 Forests
A separate and discrete action plan will be required to reverse deforestation and to build 
carbon sinks.
Issues
As discussed in the previous chapter, deforestation is responsible for 15-20 percent of 
all GHG emissions. Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (referred to 
as REDD), together with afforestation, offers significant abatement potential. Indeed  
a global climate deal will not be successful without strong action on forests.
There are a variety of proposals for addressing forests. These range from including forests 
in emissions trading thus creating economic incentives to avoid deforestation, to funding 
programmes to support reforestation, to better forest management, to alternative 
livelihoods for current forest-users.
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Few countries have the capacity to measure and monitor their emissions, let alone  
the ability to enforce laws to reduce deforestation. It will thus be essential to craft  
these systems to create “investment ready” forest projects. If investors are not able to 
document the results clearly, it will be difficult to attract the necessary funds. Proposals 
also need to be developed and pilots created to show how new funding from a forestry 
programme might be successfully applied. Both national and international institutions 
need to be built and strengthened to support such forestry efforts.
Further work and choices
•  Should forests be included in market mechanisms? What would be the likely 
effectiveness for forests, and the impact on the broader carbon market (e.g., 
quality, price of emissions permits)?
•  What is the right programme-based funding mechanism, and what are the likely 
funding needs, sources, and institutional structures?
•  How do we determine country-by-country institutional and capability needs and 
create mechanisms to provide funding and support?
•  What is the best way to review global measuring and monitoring capabilities?  
What support is necessary?
9 Adaptation
As the IPCC has concluded, climate change is occurring now, and will likely continue even 
with urgent action to cut emissions. Some degree of adaptation will thus not be a choice 
but a necessity. The IPCC has further identified developing countries as the most 
vulnerable to climate risks, in particular due to likely impacts on food security and water 
security. Adaptation has not received the attention it should have, yet it will be a large part 
of the deal in Copenhagen. While the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol is now becoming 
operational and funded by a levy on the CDM, it is clear that its scale is far too small.
Issues
The Bali Action Plan envisions action on adaptation as an integral part of the Copenhagen 
deal. The Adaptation Fund in the Kyoto Protocol is a first step to address the issue. 
However, up until this point, the issue of adaptation is split across the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol, with no overarching framework to pull those programmes, small as they 
currently might be, together with some of the larger needed efforts in the areas of 
disaster relief, health and food security. The Adaptation Fund, under the Kyoto Protocol, 
is only now getting up and running. There is, however, as yet no plan for how to coordinate  
or manage the massive issues that emerge from adaptation; and very little capacity, 
particularly in developing countries, for thinking through what this means practically  
for development planning and implementation. There is also currently little confidence 
amongst the donor community that if the billions are raised, the funds will be applied to 
the most urgent and critical needs. 
Tropical countries  
with greatest loss of  
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The challenge is that the world’s largest forests are concentrated in developing countries 
populated by some of the world’s poorest people (Exhibit 1). Forest management 
involves complex economic challenges in providing incentives to preserve forests and 
creating alternative economic opportunities, as well as complex institutional challenges 
in monitoring and enforcing forestry regimes over immense areas. 
Millions of hectares of forest loss 1990-2005
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While developing countries point out that action on adaptation needs to be integrated 
with development agendas, they note that adaptation should be viewed as incremental 
to development assistance (e.g., assistance in recovering from flooding induced by climate 
change should not detract from support for development). They worry that they will be 
facing reduced overseas development aid at the same time as having to find the funds to 
cope with the increased floods and droughts that are forecast. Overall funding 
requirements have been estimated at $28-$67 billion per year in financing to developing 
countries by 2030.17 But, as the range of the estimate shows, significant work remains in 
determining detailed funding requirements. Work remains, too, on the institutional 
arrangements for distributing funding and ensuring it is most effectively used. 
Further effort is required to flesh out bolder proposals such as a global insurance 
programme, both on the micro and macro level. Least developed countries are the most 
at risk from climate impacts, due to limited infrastructure and resources. Financial risk 
instruments help pool and share risk and can either be applied as stand-alone financing 
instruments that provide effective risk coverage, or as elements of micro-credit 
products that bring far greater access to financing. Scaling up such insurance-based 
approaches could complement more traditional weather-related disaster strategies 
and financial mechanisms. 
Further work and choices
•  What is the level of funding needed for adaptation and what should be the 
mechanisms for raising that funding? 
•  What are the institutional arrangements required to distribute and create accountability 
for funds? For example, it might make sense to create a Global Adaptation Framework 
that incorporates the range of institutions currently working on the various areas 
included in the adaptation debate (developing country governments, Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, World Health Organisation, Red Cross, etc.) and devises a 
plan for how to respond in real time to real needs. These needs can be identified in 
National Adaptation Plans of Action.
•  What are the measures to ensure that capacity exists on the ground to identify the 
risks and plan ahead? The Framework should include regional centres of excellence, 
including national universities and research centres in developing countries, to study 
the potential impacts on the regional, national and local scale and advise governments.
•  What is the potential to create global insurance and micro insurance schemes, and 
how might they might work?
10 Institutions and mechanisms for action
It is clear that there will need to be new institutions and mechanisms to make a  
global deal work. But they need not be centralised, and they need not be conventional 
bureaucracies. There is real scope for public/private partnerships.
Issues
One of the most significant challenges, both in Copenhagen, and for the wider 
implementation of a comprehensive international climate policy framework, will be to 
strengthen the UNFCCC, and design and agree on the institutional arrangements that 
will carry out the treaty’s policies and deliver on its objectives. The scale of financial 
flows, the need for monitoring, reporting and verification, and the complexity of the 
network of policies, measures, markets and incentives require these arrangements to 
be agile, efficient and well-resourced. Likewise, it is crucial that these institutions allow 
the framework to evolve without requiring major political interventions and potential 
logjams at every step.
It is clear that a framework based exclusively on current UN and Bretton Woods 
institutions is unlikely to be able to meet this challenge. While the UNFCCC will continue  
to have a core role, new institutions will need to be developed for areas such as carbon 
market oversight, and funding for technology, forestry and adaptation. It will also be 
important to make use of the academic community, NGOs, local governments and other 
decentralised structures; and to draw on successful applications of public-private 
partnership approaches and of delegation of responsibility to the private sector.
The Copenhagen agreement will also need to establish principles of subsidiarity  
to ensure that decisions are devolved to the lowest level (e.g., city, state, country)  
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as much as possible, and to minimise the build-up of new, bureaucratic international 
institutions.
Finally, the agreement will need mechanisms to ensure that its institutions and policies 
evolve and respond over time to developments in the science and economics of climate 
change, as well as to the changing circumstances of its participating countries. But at 
the same time, these institutions must be viewed as strong and credible over long  
time horizons.
Further work and choices
•  What is the right framework for the post-Copenhagen institutions and 
mechanisms, detailing decision rights, governance, and accountability structures?
•  How do we assess what should be the lowest level to which decisions can be devolved?
• What is the role of the private sector in these mechanisms?
• What are the best existing institutions that can play a role?
      *  *  *
Stepping back from all of the detail, what will success in Copenhagen look like? At its 
core, a successful agreement will: set a high-level direction through a 2050 target; get 
the world on a path to that target through deep developed world cuts and equitable 
developing world contributions, with appropriate interim targets and waypoints; create  
a set of effective enabling mechanisms and institutions; and create a process that 
enables the deal to be improved over time as more is learned. 
The test will be whether the deal generates the investments, decisions, and financial 
flows that set the 21st Century on a new low-carbon path.
The complexity of achieving such a successful outcome is immense and will require 
leadership at the highest levels – starting with the G8.
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Success in Copenhagen will depend on the actions taken over the next eighteen months 
as national leaders, negotiators, and experts from around the world prepare for the 
UNFCCC process. It is essential that momentum starts to build now towards a positive 
outcome and that leaders engage in discussions at the highest levels, so that detailed 
proposals can be worked out for negotiation. The G8+5 is not the only forum where the 
climate issue will be discussed; there will also be the Major Economies Meeting process 
(MEM) and other forums. But the world will look to the largest and most developed 
countries to show leadership on this issue. The G8 has a particularly important opportunity 
to create the political dynamic that will lead to success for the world in Copenhagen. 
Leadership at the G8 in Hokkaido Toyako
The vital first step at Hokkaido would be for the G8 to reaffirm its commitment to 
achieving a robust long-term global agreement in Copenhagen. While there have been 
useful discussions and assessment of the many hypothetical options for putting the Bali 
Action Plan into practice, there is a pressing need for concrete proposals to push these 
discussions forward and drive the analysis that will underpin them. The G8 leaders can 
help make this a reality.
Chapter 2 described a set of further work and critical choices that negotiators will need 
to address over the next 18 months and conclude in Copenhagen. In Hokkaido, the G8 
leadership can set the frame and momentum for this journey by providing direction on 
each of the ten building blocks of a global deal. 
1 Setting the global target
In order to make detailed decisions on a global deal, the world needs a clear vision.  
First and foremost this implies recognising that a low-carbon, climate resilient world is 
essential for energy security, national security and sustainable economic development; 
and that all relevant actors (governments, businesses and civil society), and resources 
(technologies, finances and policies) need to be mobilised to make this world possible. 
Putting this vision into practice means, in turn, building on the statements agreed in 
Gleneagles and Heiligendamm and establishing the long-term global emissions target 
that will drive these actors and resources in the right direction. As this report makes 
clear, the evidence shows that if we are to have a reasonable chance of achieving the 
goal enshrined in the UNFCCC’s founding document of avoiding the dangerous effects  
of climate change, this firm target needs to be that:
 Global GHG emissions are cut by at least 50 percent by 2050.
While the specific base year used has implications for how national caps would  
be calculated, what matters for the global target is that whichever base year and 
percentage are used, annual emissions in 2050 are no higher than 20 billion tonnes  
of CO2e.  
2 An interim target
2050, however, is a long way off. The science strongly suggests that in order to meet the 
50 percent target we need put ourselves quickly on a path that sees global emissions 
peak by 2020. It is also important, however, that the target be met and achieved without 
unnecessary economic and social dislocation. The G8 leaders meeting in Hokkaido must 
find a way to balance these objectives and commit to ensuring that:
 
 There is an agreed global peaking date for carbon emissions. 
    Chap  ter 3
    Creating the Conditions for 
  a Successful Agr  eement: 
  Leadership   by  the G8
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This will set the context for the complex task in Copenhagen of determining who should 
cut emissions, by how much, and when.
3 Developed world commitments and carbon market mechanisms
The G8 countries, with their greater share of historical emissions and greater 
technological and financial ability to make major improvements in carbon productivity, 
will have to be the pacesetters in the race to cut emissions. This requires them to create 
the conditions and incentives to encourage both their private and their public sectors to 
lead the world in developing and adopting low-carbon solutions. In Hokkaido it would 
send an important signal if the G8 leaders were to:
  Reaffirm the principle that the G8 and other countries of the developed world must 
lead in efforts to reduce GHG emissions, and are committed to using carbon markets  
to achieve this.
Carbon markets are likely to play a central role in creating the price for carbon that  
will be necessary to help drive the adoption of low-carbon technologies and to change 
production and consumption decisions in favour of low-carbon alternatives. It is 
therefore crucial that the emissions trading schemes currently in operation or being 
planned do not preclude evolution towards an efficient and transparent global market. 
Therefore, an invaluable component of the Hokkaido communiqué would be an 
agreement in principle to: 
  Ensure that domestic carbon markets are consistent with the rules adopted in 
Copenhagen, and set as a goal the integration of G8 member carbon markets with 
the international carbon market over time.
4 Developing world contributions
Securing the commitment of the developed countries will be necessary but not 
sufficient to achieving the level of carbon emissions reductions required. In addition,  
the major emerging markets will also need support to achieve significant increases in 
carbon productivity over the next decade. It would be a significant step in Hokkaido if  
the full G8+5 could agree to a text which would acknowledge: 
  The equitable contributions of all countries towards meeting the global reduction 
targets on the basis of national plans and the importance of developed country 
support to accelerate investment by developing countries in low-carbon technology 
and infrastructure.
5 Sectoral action
National sectoral approaches, sector incentives for developing countries, and international 
cooperation on sectors may be useful complements to carbon markets and national 
policies and measures. However, much work remains to be done on sectors. The G8 
leaders could encourage progress on sectors by commissioning for review at the 2009 
G8 in Maddalena, Italy:
  A report on the potential for sector-based approaches to complement national 
policies and carbon markets in effective delivery of mitigation targets.
6 Financing
While the carbon markets would likely provide a significant and increasing flow of capital 
to support low-carbon growth in developing countries, they will not be able to cover the 
full costs. Developing countries will need assistance in financing national action plans, 
technology acquisition and development, and sustained investments in forestry and 
climate-resilient development. As already acknowledged by many developed countries, 
this will require funding that is clearly additional to existing ODA flows. To this end:
  The G8 should agree to investigate different sources and methods of funding, 
including the auctioning of emissions permits.
7  Technology
G8 countries can stimulate the development and deployment of the major technological 
options for mitigating climate change. The IEA technology roadmaps show that CCS and 
solar energy together have the potential to achieve 15 percent of the annual emission 
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reductions needed by 2050, so accelerating their commercial viability is an absolute 
priority, particularly given projected rises in coal use.1 To bring this about, full scale  
CCS demonstration plants are needed in all the major countries where coal generation  
is likely to play a significant role in future electricity generation; and large-scale solar 
plants are needed where there are significant solar energy resources. A key signal from 
G8 leaders in Hokkaido, in partnership with their emerging economy counterparts, 
would be to commit to having:
  A significant number of coal-fired power stations with fully functioning carbon 
capture and storage and large scale solar electricity generation demonstration 
plants in operation by 2015 in a range of industrialised and developing countries.
The G8 could also provide significant acceleration of existing and new low-energy 
technologies by launching a major programme of energy efficiency improvement. Such  
a programme would increase energy security and generate high returns on investment:
  G8 leaders should commit to the full implementation of all the sixteen IEA energy 
efficiency recommendations presented to and discussed at the St. Petersburg and 
Heiligendamn summits in 2006 and 2007. 
The G8 could take a bold step further in its commitment to energy efficiency and build on 
the successful experience of its Japanese hosts by:
  Investigating the case for an institutional framework modelled on Japan’s Top-
Runner programme to coordinate the setting and updating of international energy 
efficiency standards for appliances, vehicles, industrial plants, buildings, and other 
appropriate sectors.
8 Forests
Given the major role that reducing the loss of forest will have in cutting CO2 emissions 
and the multiple benefits that accompany it, the G8 should:
  
  Explicitly recognise the central importance of forests as critical carbon sinks and 
sources of potential carbon abatement, and as such, the need to create strong 
incentives to reduce deforestation and encourage afforestation; and 
  Launch a programme to develop pilot projects in partnership with major forest 
nations aimed at testing different approaches to reducing deforestation and 
encouraging afforestation.
9  Adaptation
The G8 countries can demonstrate their recognition of the importance of adaptation by 
beginning to implement the recommendations that have come out of the Nairobi Work 
Programme adopted under the UNFCCC in 2006. The funding commitments already 
being discussed could be used to:
 
  Provide funding for one priority project in each of the National Adaptation Plans of 
Action. To send a clear signal about the importance of adaptation, this funding would 
ideally be in place by the 2009 G8 Summit.
In addition, Hokkaido could provide the setting for a bold new initiative around a global 
reinsurance scheme that would provide, through a mix of public and private funding, a 
safety net for some of the world’s most vulnerable people. While there are many details 
that would need to be worked through, it would be entirely feasible to call upon the 
finance ministries of the G8 to:
  
  Work with the global insurance industry to establish how the insurance industry can 
play its part in the climate change question, in particular to design a safety net for 
low-income people across the world who are exposed to climate change risk
G8 member nations could also benefit from coordinated action and sharing of practices 
and plans for adaptation, as well as signal commitment to the need for climate 
preparedness by:
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   Asking G8 environment ministers to review G8 adaptation needs and assess 
opportunities for cross-G8 coordination.
10 Institutions and mechanisms of action
An effective global climate regime needs a high-quality, trusted set of institutions  
to monitor performance, allocate funds, transfer know-how, influence market and 
technology development, and feed improved scientific understanding into updated 
targets. A global climate regime provides a critical opportunity to build on the world’s 
collective experience of multilateral institutions over the past 50 years – and to 
translate that learning into a network of high-performing, open (and at times, 
competing) institutions for managing the global climate regime. 
The G8 leaders could accelerate progress on this imperative by asking their respective 
governments to:
  
  Develop proposals for ensuring that a global climate deal (a) has appropriate 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms; (b) is flexible in responding to new scientific 
and economic evidence; (c) has mechanisms for ensuring an effective carbon price; 
(d) is capable of adjustment based on performance versus targets and commitments; 
(e) engages government, multilateral, social sector and private sector institutions  
in its delivery mechanisms; and (f) has a governance structure that is accountable 
for institutional performance and fairly represents both the developed and 
developing world.
From Hokkaido and the 2008 MEM Leaders’ Meeting to the 2009 G8  
in Maddalena
In addition to the agreements and actions outlined above, chapter 2 has shown that 
there are a number of aspects of the agreement in Copenhagen that will need decisions 
at the highest level of government, but for which the best options are still not clear. It  
is also obvious from all that has been discussed so far that there is a vast amount of 
detailed technical work and research to be done in support of the political negotiation 
process. The IPCC and the UNFCCC continue their excellent work. But they need help. 
While all nations will ultimately have to agree to a climate deal, agreement amongst the 
world’s major economies is a critical precursor to a successful outcome in Copenhagen.
The G8+5 was formed at Gleneagles in 2005 precisely to do this – to create an informal 
gathering of the major countries so that common areas of agreement could be reached. 
The MEM process, led by the US, is working toward that same end.
It is surely sensible that some form of co-ordination between the major economies 
continues after Hokkaido and then onto the Maddalena G8.
The process initiated by the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005, and due to conclude at 
Hokkaido, set in motion a number of activities that have increased understanding of the 
potential solutions – the IEA energy efficiency recommendations, the IEA technology 
roadmaps and the World Bank’s Clean Energy Investment Framework. The process has 
also brought different actors together to support consensus – through the GLOBE 
Legislators Dialogue and the World Economic Forum’s CEO process. 
Establishing a similar process in Hokkaido to run through to the 2009 Summit in 
Maddalena, would have significant value in directing research efforts and further honing 
the options facing political leaders over the next 18 months. This process would be 
significantly strengthened through the establishment of a small secretariat to co-
ordinate key workstreams over the next 12 months, and to ensure alignment with the 
UNFCCC process and expert networks. As described in chapter 2, there are key technical 
and policy issues that still need to be analysed – each of which has very considerable 
implications for the likely costs and benefits of adjustment to a low-carbon economy.  
By the time of Maddalena, it would be of immense value if the G8+5 leadership were able 
to agree on key outstanding issues and make specific proposals, for example on:
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1  The date at which global emissions need to peak and the implications for the  
pace and depth of developed nation emissions cuts.
2  The process and mechanisms for linking domestic carbon markets and scaling  
up international carbon finance flows through these markets.
3  An assessment of the financial flows from developed countries to developing 
countries that will be required in the Copenhagen agreement, and their potential 
sources.
  A progress report on G8 efforts to pilot CCS and large-scale solar.
5  A progress report on implementation of IEA energy efficiency recommendations 
and a proposal for a G8-led international energy efficiency framework.
6  A G8 assessment of options for forestry and a progress report on pilots.
7  A proposal from G8 finance ministers on how a global insurance mechanism could 
be created to provide a safety net for the world’s poor, who are most exposed to 
climate change risk.
8  A review of G8 preparedness for adaptation challenges.
9  A review of proposals on the institutional arrangements for supporting the 
Copenhagen treaty.
10  An assessment of key outstanding issues that would benefit from G8 leader  
or ministerial discussion after Maddalena and before Copenhagen.
      *  *  *
The G8 is meeting at a crucial moment in time. The scientific case for moving to a low-
carbon economy is clear. The economic case says it can be done by transforming our 
economy in ways that will create new sources of growth, new jobs, energy security, and 
greater equity and opportunity in the world. But the political complexities of gaining 
agreement from 191 countries to travel this path are immense. By providing clear and 
decisive direction, the Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit has the opportunity to make 2008 
the year the world began this historic journey.
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